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Abstract
New standards and initiatives in satellite system architecture are moving the space
industry to more open and efficient mission operations. Primarily, these standards allow
multiple missions to share standard ground and space-based resources to reduce mission
development and sustainment costs. With the benefits of these new concepts comes
added risk associated with threats to the security of our critical space assets in a contested
space and cyberspace domain. As one method to mitigate threats to space missions, this
research develops, implements, and tests the Consolidated Trust Management System
(CTMS) for satellite flight software.
The CTMS architecture was developed using design requirements and features of
Trust Management Systems (TMS) presented in the field of distributed information
systems. This research advances the state of the art with the CTMS by refining and
consolidating existing TMS theory and applying it to satellite systems. The feasibility
and performance of this new CTMS architecture is demonstrated with a realistic
implementation in satellite flight software and testing in an emulated satellite system
environment. The system is tested with known threat modeling techniques and a specific
forgery attack abuse case of satellite telecommanding functions. The CTMS test results
show the promise of this technique to enhance security in satellite flight software
telecommand processing. With this work, a new class of satellite protection mechanisms
is established, which addresses the complex security issues facing satellite operations
today. This work also fills a critical shortfall in validated security mechanisms for
implementation in both public and private sector satellite systems.
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TRUST MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY IN SATELLITE TELECOMMAND
PROCESSING

I. Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter gives a general introduction to the problem domain and provides an
overview of the thesis research area. The significance of the problem being addressed
and motivation for research is also presented in this section. Additionally, this chapter
introduces the research goal and presents an overview of the thesis.
Satellite systems currently influence many aspects of modern society. From daily
banking transactions to personal communications to global food production, modern
society is dependent on the existence of satellite systems. These systems are launched
and maintained by both commercial and governmental organizations and consist of
ground and space-based segments. The primary entity in the ground segment of a
satellite system is the satellite control center, or ground station, which commands and
maintains the operational status of the satellite in orbit. The space-based segment of a
satellite system consists of the orbiting satellite or constellation of satellites. Whether
commercially or government owned and operated, satellite systems of all types have
made their way into our lives.
Considering the vital role satellite systems play in modern society, these assets
can be classified as national critical infrastructure. As defined in the United States Patriot
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Act of 2001, critical infrastructure includes "systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters [1]."
Current public policy in the United States regarding critical infrastructure can be
tied to Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) "Critical Infrastructure Protection"
published in May 1998 [2]. The guidance in PDD-63 describes critical infrastructure and
sets national policy for protecting such infrastructure. This policy identifies
responsibilities the Department of Defense (DoD) has for critical infrastructure
protection, specifically, identifying the need to counter the threat of cyber attacks.
This added focus on cyber-based attacks stems from the increasing
interdependence of critical national functions, such as banking, energy, and
transportation, on advanced technology. One specific area of technology both supporting
and serving as critical infrastructure is satellite systems. While the integration of new
technology to these areas increases capacity and efficiency, it also makes the
infrastructure more vulnerable to disruption and attack both physically and through
cyberspace. Due to system integration, such an attack has the potential to create
cascading failures. Because of the relatively recent progression from disconnected
systems to complex interconnected systems, this threat is unprecedented, thus justifying
research into new security mechanisms for critical infrastructure [2].
The DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan (CIPP) published in November 1998,
followed from PDD-63 to address the DoD plan to protect its portion of the nation's
critical infrastructure. The DoD portion of national critical infrastructure is divided into

2

sectors, one of which is "Defense Space" [3]. The Defense Space Infrastructure Sector
detailed in the DoD CIPP consists of both space and ground-based assets. These include
launch, specialized logistics, and control systems located worldwide on both DoD and
commercially controlled sites [3].
These national and DoD policies state that satellite systems are currently considered a
national critical infrastructure and require protection efforts. These efforts include
vulnerability assessment and mitigation methods. This reality motivates research to
identify potential vulnerabilities in satellite systems and to develop methods to mitigate
associated risks.
To begin addressing security in satellite systems, this research considers common
threats to space missions as presented in satellite security publications. The Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has published several reports concerning
threats and security protocols relating to satellite systems [4,5,6]. A specific and the most
significant threat discussed in these and related works involve the satellite command link,
also known as the telecommand system. This threat is further categorized in this work.
Furthermore, a specific forgery attack generally referred to as an abuse case is developed
to illustrate satellite command link security issues.
Telecommand is a common term in the space industry referring to command and
control communications through a wireless command link used to control satellites in
orbit. According to the CCSDS report, Telecommand: Summary of Concept and Service,
a telecommand system conveys control information from an originating source to a
remotely located physical device or process [7]. In satellite systems, the controlled
device is primarily a satellite bus, payload, or process aboard a spacecraft. The term
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telecommand used in this document refers to communications which initiate, modify, or
terminate certain functions of a satellite [8].
Traditional space mission telecommand systems consist of centralized, missionspecific architecture [7]. These systems have unique components, data formats, and
procedures for each space mission. This focus on mission unique technology and
telecommand architecture is changing. The most significant of these changes are the
development and implementation of open standards for spacecraft control. The primary
motivation for the implementation of these standards is to reduce costs and satisfy cross
support activities for satellite systems [5]. With the application of a general open
telecommanding architecture, greater focus must be placed on satellite command link
security.
Traditionally, logical security in satellite systems has not been a primary concern.
Focus on system development in the space domain has primarily been on safe
functionality rather than system security from malicious intent. The predominate reason
for this is the critical fault intolerant nature of operating in space. The improper
configuration of software onboard a satellite can leave a multimillion dollar space system
useless, thus discouraging security features [9]. Another factor influencing this basic
functional versus security focus is the threat profile in the space domain.
In the past, satellite systems were off limits to individuals and many organizations
due to complexity and cost of entry. With the reduction of cost and the introduction of
system standards, satellite system technology is now more widely available than ever [5].
In an effort to remedy the current Flight Software (FSW) security situation resulting from
these factors, this work addresses the application of security features for satellite system
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commanding. The new features considered in this work utilize the concepts of trust
management from the distributed information systems domain.

1.2 Preview
In summary, safety and security in satellite system commanding operations are in
jeopardy given the increased access to the space domain, lack of space system security
focus, and an increasing trend in global cyber threats [6,10]. It is proposed that satellite
system safety and security can be improved with a proven trust management architecture
which addresses common cyber threats to space assets. The focus of this research is to
develop an efficient and effective method of applying interaction trust via a Trust
Management System (TMS) to satellite system commanding for enhanced mission safety
and security.
Chapter II presents a review of related literature that introduces the satellite system
domain in detail along with security and trust management principles. Chapter III details
the proposed TMS for satellite telecommanding incorporating multiple trust mechanisms
and introduces abuse case methodology for evaluating the system. Chapter IV presents
the experiment setup used for testing FSW and the developed TMS with a forgery attack
abuse case. Chapter IV also covers results of the TMS testing and performance
characteristics of the TMS. Chapter V provides an analysis of the results with
recommendations for further research in the field.
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II. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a review of literature, concepts and existing work relevant to the
development of a trust-based security model for satellite systems. First, a review of the
space domain as it relates to satellite systems is presented, covering the roles, missions,
operating environment, and components of satellite systems. Second, literature related to
satellite system threats is introduced. Third, security principles and threats which apply
to satellite and computer systems are reviewed. Finally, the concept of trust, as it relates
to distributed information systems and trust related work is presented.
This thesis focuses on threat detection and mitigation in satellite system
telecommanding operations through the application of a Trust Management System
(TMS) to satellite Flight Software (FSW). Most threats to spacecraft telecommand links
are a result of their Radio Frequency (RF) transmissions being broadcast through an
open medium [5,6]. To understand the threats and risks to satellite telecommanding
systems an investigation of existing work which classifies threats to satellite systems is
performed. To form a response to these threats, concepts of computer and satellite
security are reviewed. Principals of trust management in distributed information systems
and other fields are also examined to support this thesis. Concepts from relevant trust
research are utilized to realize the primary goal of this work, to develop and apply a new
satellite security mechanism utilizing trust management theory. This effort requires a
general understanding of space system missions, space environment, and system
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components. These principles of satellite systems lay the foundation for common
satellite operations upon which system security can be evaluated.

2.2 Satellite Systems Role
Satellite systems influence many aspects of modern society. From daily banking
transactions to personal communications to global food production, our society is
dependent on the existence and operation of satellite systems.
Not only do many commercial industries rely on the use of satellite resources to
conduct daily operations, government entities have also grown similarly dependent on
satellite systems [11,12]. The U.S. DoD currently utilizes many types of satellite systems
and has contributed to the advancement of satellite systems in general. Official policies
of the U.S. government emphasize the critical nature of these systems to the prosperity of
the nation and call for the protection of these systems [13,12,14].
Traditionally, satellite systems operating in the public and private sectors have been
large-scale and highly proprietary in nature. With more than 50 years since the launch of
the first satellite, much has changed in the way of satellite systems and the computer
components vital to their operation. Satellite system components are now becoming
more standard across missions along with the integration of mission operations with
internet technology. This changing culture in satellite system development and
operations will increase efficiency but also provide new security challenges [6]. One
example of this phenomenon is illustrated by the CubeSat standard and its various
derivative projects. This new trend in satellite systems does not only apply to small
satellites, however applies to all of the mission areas for satellite systems.
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2.3 Satellite Systems Mission Areas
The missions of satellite systems can be categorized into four main areas: Remote
Sensing; Communications; Precision Navigation and Timing; and Science/Exploration
[15]. One key aspect of satellite systems is that the primary mission will determine in
which orbit the satellite will operate [11,16,17,15], see Section 2.4.1. The following
sections examine the characteristics of each mission area.
2.3.1 Remote Sensing.
The primary mission of remote sensing satellite systems is to observe the Earth and
other objects from orbit. Satellites in orbit provide a unique observation platform from
which to view the Earth. Remote sensing satellites utilize Radio Detection and Ranging
(RADAR), optical, and other sensors to collect images and measurements. These systems
can also detect Infrared (IR) and other emanations from Earth.
Optical observation is used to produce images of the Earth’s surface which can be
analyzed to provide valuable information. This information aids military operations and
intelligence, as well as documentation of urban development, scientific research, and
predictions of crop yields for global food supply planning [18]. Additionally, IR sensors
aboard military satellites are used to provide missile launch and nuclear detonation
detection [19]. One of the earliest benefits of space systems was the prediction and
analysis of Earth's weather patterns. Optical and IR sensors are used to observe visible
weather phenomena as well as collect atmospheric measurements for weather forecasting
[20]. These satellites are even used to monitor space weather, see Section 2.4.2.

8

2.3.2 Communications.
Communication satellites revolutionized the way humans communicate. A satellites
unique field of view makes it an ideal communications relay platform. Satellite
communications (SATCOM) links have been used to provide intercontinental
communications for major telecommunications providers since the mid 1960s [16].
Large corporations use SATCOM to link together many geographically separated
organizational units into one network in order to facilitate logistics and enhance daily
operations [11]. SATCOM is also extensively used by military forces to conduct
operations around the globe.
2.3.3 Precision Navigation and Timing.
The United States government pioneered the development of precision navigation and
timing satellite constellations beginning with the TRANSIT satellite constellation in 1960
and culminating with the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) which became
operational in 1993 [15]. NAVSTAR GPS satellites, along with ground control and
monitoring stations, provide accurate three-dimensional locations and timing for use in
civilian and military operations worldwide. After the introduction of GPS for
government use, the tremendous commercial implications for the GPS signal have led to
its widespread civilian use and eventual dependence.
Examples of private sector and individual use of GPS include banking, transportation
and communications. The banking and global financial markets now rely on GPS timing
to synchronize transaction systems. Individuals routinely use GPS signal for navigation
assistance. Finally, as the wireless telephone market developed with the freely available
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timing provided by GPS, these systems are now dependent on this method of time
synchronization [21].
2.3.4 Science/Exploration
Satellites orbiting with science/exploration missions continue to advance technology
used in satellite systems and contribute to many diverse fields of science. Such missions
have led to advancements in Earth and materials science, as well as astronomy. These
science/exploration missions provide immeasurable value to the human understanding
and way of life through invaluable advancements and discoveries [22].
Examples of these space related technologies being transferred to two diverse areas of
our daily lives are advancements in medical imaging and the development of cordless
tools. The medical imaging technology advancement stems from the charged coupled
devices (CCDs) used aboard the Hubble space telescope which convert light directly into
digital images. These devices are now used to image the human body and differentiate
between benign and cancerous tissues. Additionally, technology developed to recover
lunar samples was directly transferred to domestic use as battery powered power tools
and appliances [23].

2.4 Space Orbits and Environment
Operating in space presents many challenges to the success of satellite systems. In
order to conduct a successful satellite mission, considerations must be made with regard to
a satellites orbit, and the space environment. The space environment consists of extreme
temperatures and pressure, along with multiple forms of radiation. Additionally, these
environmental factors are impacted by the orbit at which a satellite is operating [17].
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2.4.1 Orbits.
A satellite’s primary mission will dictate the orbit in which the satellite will be
placed. The orbit placement in turn will determine when and how long a ground station
has a satellite within field of view, and how much transmission power is required for
communications between the satellite and ground stations. Orbit placement also
influences satellite power considerations, stability, and attitude control options [15].
There are two satellite orbit shapes: circular and elliptical. For both orbital shapes, the
center of the Earth is in the plane of the orbit with an inclination taken between the
orbital and equatorial plane. Circular orbits are further subcategorized by altitude: Low
Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and geosynchronous orbits [16,15,24].
LEO satellites operate with an altitude up to 1500 km and are primarily used for
remote sensing and science missions, with some communication applications being made
with advanced cross linking satellite platforms [15]. The communication satellites
operating in LEO are primarily used to provide global mobile telephone service.
Advantages and disadvantages for LEO satellites are used to determine the orbits
suitability for a particular satellite mission. The advantages of LEO are [17,15]:
- reduced cost to place payloads in orbit
- reduced communication transmission power requirements
- simplified satellite attitude control
- lower latency for communications
- higher resolution for remote sensing applications
Some disadvantages for LEO orbits are [17,15]:
-short ground station access periods
- high satellite velocities complicate communications
- short orbital lifespan due to increased drag at lower altitudes
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MEO satellites operate at an altitude of around 20,000 km, which is well outside the
Earth’s atmosphere. The increased altitude relative to LEO gives MEO satellites a
broader view of the Earth, making them more suitable for applications requiring more
global coverage. MEO class orbits can be semi-synchronous with the Earth’s rotation
with a satellite making two revolutions around the Earth in one day. These orbits are
most suitable to modern precision navigation and timing applications such as NAVSTAR
GPS [15].
Geosynchronous satellites operate at an altitude of 35,780 km and have the special
property of orbiting the Earth once every 24 hours [15]. This allows the spacecraft to
remain in a semi-fixed position relative to a specific ground station. Geosynchronous
satellites will have some perturbation in location relative to a fixed spot on Earth, which
may require ground stations communicating with them to track this slight movement.
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) is a geosynchronous orbit which has an inclination of
exactly zero degrees. GEO satellites will remain over the same fixed spot on Earth with
proper station keeping [15].
GEO and geosynchronous satellites are ideal for communication missions where the
satellite remains fixed in the sky and can reliably relay communications between two
ground stations within the satellites field of view. Each geosynchronous satellite has a
field of view of approximately one half of the Earth. Global communications, with
exception of the high latitudes, are achievable with a three satellite constellation [15].
Elliptical orbits have unique properties which can be useful for communication
missions to high latitude areas. These orbits fill the gaps in coverage left by GEO
satellites, which at best reach latitudes of 81 degrees. One specific type of elliptical orbit

12

which can be used to simulate a stationary satellite in GEO is the Molniya orbit. These
elliptical orbits with high eccentricity and an inclination of 63.4 degrees provide long
dwell times over a location on Earth. A constellation of three Molniya satellites are
required to provide continuous service to a single ground location [15].
2.4.2 Space Environment.
The space environment consists of a vacuum with varying levels of cosmic and solar
radiation. Satellites in orbit do not have the full protection from radiation provided by the
Earth's magnetosphere. This leaves satellites vulnerable to space weather conditions
which has a detrimental effect on critical systems even when protection mechanisms are
in place [17].
Space weather consists of magnetic fields, charged particles, and radiation. The
dominant factor in space weather is solar wind from the sun consisting of charged
particles and radiation bursts. The effects of solar winds vary over time, as their strength
fluctuates and as they impact Earth's magnetic field. Highly charged particles in the
space environment, from solar wind, often disrupt electronics aboard satellites [17].
The most common occurrence of electronic disruption or failure aboard satellites is
the Single Event Upset (SEU). A SEU occurs when an ion or electro-magnetic radiation
interferes with an electronic circuit in such a way that information stored in the circuit as
bits are corrupted. This action often results in a failure of the satellite's onboard
computer logic. These errors are generally not fatal for the spacecraft and normal
operation is typically resumed after resetting the system [25]. Certain orbits and areas in
space are more prone to these types of events. One commonly known area in which
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satellites experience an increased likelihood of a SEU is called the South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA).
The SAA is an area over Brazil and the south Atlantic ocean where space borne
radiation comes closer to the Earth than any other place. This area is caused by a dip in
the Earth's magnetic field allowing cosmic rays and charged particles to reach lower
altitudes. Satellites crossing this area are exposed to higher levels of radiation, which
results in the increased chance of a SEU [26].
These unpredictable, disruptive events have an impact on system design. As a result,
engineers have designed systems with failsafe defaults and recovery modes which in turn
increase mission safety. These actions lead to systems which are more mission safe and
in some cases increases system complexity.
Mission safety is a concept in which the satellite system is robust to failure and the
likelihood of satellite operators losing control due to human error or space weather is
reduced. The disadvantage of a sole focus on mission safety is that systems may be more
vulnerable to malicious actions, resulting in reduced system security. Though the
concepts of mission safety and system security appear to be competing design principals,
a balance between the two must be achieved which serves the overall requirements for
the mission.

14

2.5 Satellite System Components
The components of satellite systems are generally similar, however, the mission
determines which components are found in each system. Components are organized by
their location in the system, which is divided into three categories: ground segment, space
segment, and subscriber segment. Not all satellite systems require all segments of the
general satellite system [16].
The satellite system can be broken down and described by functional areas consisting
of major components. The exact configuration of these functional areas are influenced by
and provide support to the system's primary mission. The satellite system functional
areas described here are Satellite Hardware, Satellite Software (programmed logic),
Ground Station Hardware, Ground Station Software (programmed logic), and
Telecommand Architecture [16,15].
2.5.1 Satellite Hardware.
The orbiting hardware, or satellite, typically contains the following subsystems:
Telemetry Tracking and Command Subsystem (TT&C), Electrical Power System (EPS),
Propulsion System, Attitude Determination and Control System (ADACS), and Thermal
Control System (TCS). These subsystems constitute the satellite main bus. The main bus
is constructed to support the primary payload. The following subsections will describe
the functions of the main bus subsystems and the payload integration [16,15].
2.5.1.1 Telemetry Tracking and Command (TT&C) Subsystem.
The TT&C subsystem hardware consists of a flight computer, radio, and antenna for
communicating with a controlling ground station. The TT&C subsystem provides
satellite status data (telemetry) along with functions to command the satellite and control
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the other subsystems. The TT&C subsystem is also used to provide a tracking and
ranging service to the ground station. Tracking and ranging data is used to accurately
point high gain antennas towards the satellite and to provide accurate orbit determination
for the satellite's mission [16,15].
Commands from ground stations are received by the TT&C subsystem and command
specific actions are executed. These commands can be intended for the TT&C subsystem
itself or for any of the other subsystems. Additionally, status information from all of the
satellite subsystems is collected and formatted for transmission as satellite telemetry to
listening ground stations.
2.5.1.2 Electrical Power System (EPS).
The spacecraft's payload and satellite support systems (bus) require power provided
by the EPS to operate. The EPS manages power generation, storage, and distribution
throughout the spacecraft. These actions are done in conjunction with the logic present in
the satellite's flight computer. The power subsystem hardware consists of an EPS
controller, power source, and batteries [16].
The distribution of a spacecraft's power is managed by the EPS controller. The EPS
controller continuously monitors and adjusts connections to the power sources and the
charge/discharge rates of the onboard batteries. Additionally, the EPS controller switches
power to each of the spacecraft bus systems and payload as necessary, while reporting
power status information to the flight computer [27].
The primary power source for most satellites is photovoltaic solar cell arrays. The
power output of a solar array is proportional to the angle of incidence of solar rays on the

16

panel. If the panel is misaligned with the Sun’s radiation such that the angle of incidence
is zero, then no power will be produced [16].
Most satellites will periodically encounter eclipse periods in which no direct sunlight
reaches the spacecraft. The frequency and duration of these eclipse periods are
determined by the orbit of the satellite. During these periods, the orbiting spacecraft must
rely on a power source other than solar. Battery systems fill the gaps in power supply for
satellites during eclipse periods [15].
Satellite commands which orient a satellites solar cell arrays or configure the EPS for
power distribution are critical to the successful operation of a satellite. Any malicious or
otherwise improper processing of commands which modify the satellites power
configuration has the potential to leave the satellite crippled or otherwise inoperative.
This is one example of where specific satellite telecommands present a potential
vulnerability to satellite systems.
2.5.1.3 Propulsion subsystem.
Most long term satellites require propulsion systems to make changes to their
trajectory after being placed into orbit. These trajectory changes may be significant or
minor. Significant changes in orbit are generally made during the initial phase of a
satellites operation to reach the desired mission orbit. Once the mission orbit is
established, an onboard propulsion system is needed to maintain the orbit [15].
2.5.1.4 Attitude Determination and Control subsystem (ADACS).
The ADACS in a spacecraft is used to maintain sensor and antenna orientation for
pointing. The ADACS is composed of control logic, sensors, and mechanical systems for
adjusting the attitude of the satellite. The control logic for the ADACS is maintained by
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the spacecraft flight computer or by a secondary microcontroller. The ADACS can be
dynamically adjusted via the satellite command link. There are many sensors and
techniques for satellite attitude determination, including star tracking, sun tracking, IR
Earth sensing, and RF tracking [15].
With accurate spacecraft attitude information, the flight computer can make
adjustments in position with the attitude control systems. These systems are used to
accurately point sensors at a desired location or place the spacecraft in a desired
orientation [15]. Any failure or malicious activity disrupting the operation of these
systems could result in total loss of the satellite.
2.5.1.5 Thermal Control System (TCS).
Space is extreme with respect to temperature. External satellite components can
experience temperatures ranging from -200 to +150 degrees Celsius [15]. These
temperature extremes drive the development of spacecraft thermal control systems. Two
methods of thermal control are passive design techniques and active thermal control
systems. Passive design techniques rely on material conduction and radiation properties.
Active thermal control systems include electric heaters and radiators which must be
operated as conditions change on the satellite. A satellite's thermal design is critical to its
successful operation. Thermal systems are monitored by telemetry sent through the
command link. Adjustments to active components of the thermal control system can be
made via specific thermal control commands [15].
2.5.1.6 Payload.
The main system payload will correspond to the satellite's mission. The payload can
consist of sensors, communication devices, or scientific equipment. The deployment and
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control of the payload is facilitated by the flight computer and command system with
support from the other bus systems for power, pointing, and thermal management [15].
2.5.2 Satellite Flight Software (FSW).
The satellite FSW running on the main flight computer is a critical component of the
satellite and manages all aspects of the satellite hardware (TT&C, EPS, Propulsion,
ADACS, TCS, Payload) [28]. Portions of the FSW must be specifically tailored to each
function of the spacecraft bus. Some of the spacecraft management can be automated to
handle faults as they occur and alleviate the need for intervention by the commanding
ground station.
2.5.3 Ground Station Hardware.
Satellite systems are managed by ground stations which send control information to
the orbiting satellite in the form of discrete commands. These control messages are
commands, which specifically address each of the satellite subsystems previously
mentioned (TT&C, EPS, Propulsion, ADACS, TCS, Payload). Additionally, the ground
station receives satellite telemetry of the satellite's status [16].
A typical satellite ground station has three main components: RF Interface, Signal
Processing, Mission Execution. The RF Interface is composed of the antenna, low noise
amplifier, power amplifier, signal down converter and signal up converter. The Signal
Processing component consists of a transceiver, Terminal Node Controller (TNC), and
modem. The mission execution segment typically consists of command terminals
operating ground control software and integrates the mission specific processing
components with the other ground station components. Satellite systems may utilize
multiple ground stations for redundancy purposes [16].
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2.5.4 Ground Control Software.
Ground control software facilitates the commanding of satellites within a satellite
system. The software runs on computers at the ground station or on remote systems
which connect via networks to the ground station. The function of ground control
software is to transmit commands to the satellite, receive and interpret telemetry data
passed back from the satellite, and pass updates to the satellite software [16].
The design and implementation of ground control software is driven by mission
requirements. The architecture of ground control software can be divided into two
sections: common ground control components and mission unique components. The
common ground control components are not mission specific and can be used with
multiple satellite systems. An example of software which has been developed to serve
the function of common ground control components is the Common Ground Architecture
(CGA) command software. CGA is ground control software with a large percentage of
the architecture consisting of reusable ground control code. This modular design allows
CGA to support multiple satellite missions with the same core components and mission
specific applications. Each satellite system CGA supports has specially designed mission
unique components [29].
2.5.5 Telecommanding Architecture.
Satellite system telecommanding architecture will differ by implementation, however
some key concepts are presented as features contributing to the safety and security of
satellite commanding in general. Additionally, some examples of satellite
telecommanding architecture are covered to illustrate the concept and highlight areas
where trust management concepts may be applied.
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The telecommanding architecture and implementation play a crucial role in the safety
and security of a satellite system due to the open nature of communications between
ground stations and satellites. Critical vulnerabilities in the telecommanding architecture
implementation can allow events, whether malicious, accidental, or environmental, to
disrupt or destroy a satellite [6]. The following features have been seen in satellite
telecommanding architectures and are similar to concepts found in distributed
information systems:


Satellite addressing is implemented in a telecommanding architecture to direct
commands to a specific satellite or decoder. This feature affords some
protection from commands being erroneously processed by the wrong satellite
or satellite subsystem [15].



Command register verification confirms commands to be processed aboard a
satellite by transmitting the command queue to the ground station for
acknowledgment before execution [15].



Encryption is used to provide the security service of confidentiality to the
telecommanding architecture. It can be implemented in many levels of the
architecture resulting in varying impacts on system performance, complexity,
reliability, and security [5,30].



Command counters in the telecommanding architecture provide an element of
security and safety to the system. The command counter assigns a unique
number to each command being transmitted to the satellite. Command
counters are primarily implemented to ensure commands are executed at most
once and in the proper order. If commands are processed out of order or in
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duplicate, the system could become unstable resulting in mission degradation
or loss of the satellite [15].


Authenticated commands in the telecommand architecture is implemented by
checking the command counter or through more complex cryptographic
mechanisms [15]. The use of a command counter for command authentication
provides command execution safety, where cryptographic user authentication
enables system security.



The use of time stamps in telecommanding architecture involves assigning a
time stamp to each telecommand message. The time stamp is used by the
satellite to verify the sequence of commands being received. Time stamps
feature is also useful in detecting the replay of a command [15].

The following are examples of how the telecommand architecture can be
implemented in a satellite system:
The command execution of a satellite as described by Patton [15] is typically a twostep process. First, the satellite operator selects a command which is formatted by the
ground control software and equipment for transmission to the satellite. This command
formatting appends a preamble to the transmitted command. The preamble contains an
address key which identifies the particular satellite for which the command is intended.
This specific address key provides protection against stray signals being received and
executed by the satellites TT&C subsystem. Once the TT&C subsystem receives a
command from the ground station with the proper address, the contents of the command
register (current command to execute) are transmitted to the ground station for
verification. If the command is successfully validated by the ground station, the
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transmission is acknowledged by transmission back to the satellite, at which time the
command is executed. It should be noted that the commanding procedures for satellite
systems can vary greatly between systems of differing size, complexity, and purpose
[15].
The command execution sequence for the satellite system used as a model in this
research is a derivative of CubeSat FSW and concept of operations. In this model,
commands are formatted at the ground station with the ground control software CGA.
CGA interprets human readable commands and builds a data stream which is then
transmitted to the satellite. The data stream transmitted to the satellite contains ground
station and space station ID numbers. These are used to confirm that the command is
originating from a valid ground station ID and is directed to the proper satellite interface.
The command data stream also contains a message protocol and command identifier
which are used to determine the satellites response to the command. As a safety feature,
a command authentication count is included in the message header. The command
authentication count is used in conjunction with most commands and verifies the satellite
and ground station is in sync during the commanding process. Command arguments
(parameters) are marshaled after the authentication count. CGA computes a checksum
over the command header and arguments, and appends it to the end of the command data
stream. The checksum ensures data integrity during the command transmission [29,31].

2.6 Space System Threats and Security
This section describes space system threats and corresponding security mechanisms.
However, this treatment of space system threats is not exhaustive, but is provided to serve
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as a broad overview and background for the development of scenarios to aide in the
testing of new security features for satellite telecommanding. Information regarding
possible threats to space missions is necessary for mission planners to better understand
the security mechanisms and policies required to mitigate them. All systems are subject
to threats which may result in the loss of data or catastrophic damage to the system [6].
A threat is a potential violation of security. The occurrence of a violation is not
necessary for a threat to be present. An attack refers to activity related to the violation of
security. In order for a successful attack to take place, the system must be vulnerable to
the threat in action. The existence of a possible violation of security requires actions to
be taken which guard against threatening activity and mitigate system vulnerabilities
[32].
The following sub-sections serve as an overview of the most common threats to space
missions. This information highlights the findings presented in the CCSDS report
Security Threats Against Space Missions [6].
2.6.1 Data Corruption.
Data corruption occurs as the result of a fault in either the ground or space segment of
a satellite system or by the intentional or unintentional action of an individual. This
corruption event may take place in the hardware or software of the satellite system's
components. Common faults include hardware failures or a SEU in the spacecraft. The
effects of data corruption can range from an unnoticed anomaly in telemetry data to
catastrophic loss of the spacecraft due to the processing of a corrupt command [6].
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2.6.2 Interception Of Data.
Data communications with spacecraft are achieved via RF signals which are subject
to interception. The extent to which this threat applies to a space mission is dependent
upon the orbit in which the space segment of the system is operating. LEO missions are
less susceptible due to the short access period and small beam width of the downlink
signal. Conversely, missions operating in high orbits such as GEO have large downlink
beams and long access periods and therefore increased susceptibility to interception.
Transmissions from ground stations are typically less susceptible to interception due to
the highly directional antennas and small beam widths used to communicate with
satellites. Signals may be intercepted by listening ground stations and by signal
intelligence gathering aircraft or spacecraft [6].
2.6.3 Jamming.
Persistent RF interference is characterized as jamming. The RF signals used for
communications with spacecraft are susceptible to interference. Interfering signals can
be intentional or unintentional and can result in link loss or denial of communications
with the satellite. This interference is accomplished by transmitting a competing signal
on the same frequency the satellite is operating. Interference can originate from a ground
station or from a third party satellite orbiting within line of site of the mission ground and
primary satellite [6].
2.6.4 Masquerade.
Entities in a satellite system must interact with others remotely. These interactions
may require identification prior to each requested action. If an entity can lie about its
identity, or identification is not accurately validated, entities can illegitimately pose as
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one another in the system. If an entity in the system poses as any other entity it is said to
be masquerading. The masquerading entity can violate security policies by taking
unauthorized actions [6].
2.6.5 Replay.
There exists the possibility of a re-transmission of commands to the space segment of
a satellite system. This replay of a specific command can occur due to a commanding
protocol or by a malicious third party attempting to gain access or cause damage to a
satellite. A ground station protocol resulting in the replay of a command may be the
result of a previous command not properly acknowledged by the satellite, thereby
prompting the re-transmission of the assumed lost command. The effects of a satellite
erroneously processing duplicate commands can range from none to catastrophic loss of
the satellite due to a duplicate orbit maneuver or breach of satellite security [6].
2.6.6 Software Threats.
Computer software plays a crucial role in the operation of a satellite system in both
the space and ground segments. This software is susceptible to logic errors, data input
handling errors, among other common programming mistakes. Additionally, operators
may introduce improper configurations, resulting in security vulnerabilities or system
instability [6].
2.6.7 Unauthorized Access.
Policies set forth in the operation of a space mission determine which entities should
have access to specific systems and functions. Entities accessing systems or functions
which violate these policies constitute unauthorized access in the system [6]. Entities
may gain unauthorized access to the satellite system through a combination of other
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threats to the system. The abuse case presented in Section 4.4 is an example of
unauthorized satellite access through a forgery attack. This attack also incorporates
elements of the other threats discussed such as data replay and masquerading.

2.7 Trust
The issue of trust has become a significant concern within distributed information
system architectures such as web services, cooperative computing, and mobile computing
[33,34]. Trust issues are not only present in business, social and operational functions,
but also in technologies used to facilitate these activities. Additionally, due to the tight
coupling between a systems operational requirements and the technology used in
implementation, trust relationships from the operational architecture must be modeled in
the distributed information system. Specific distributed information systems must
address all of the trust issues present in the operational scenario and those that arise in the
technical implementation [33].
One example of modeling operational trust relationships in a distributed system
implementation can be made for satellite system telecommanding. The operational
function of telecommanding inherently involves a trust relationship between the satellite
in orbit and a commanding ground station. The satellite in orbit must process
telecommands from the ground station in a manner which preserves the functionality and
security of the satellite. This trust relationship in the operational function of
telecommanding must be modeled in the satellites implementation in order to satisfy the
operational trust relationship.
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2.7.1 Trust Management System Examples.
Research covering trust management in distributed computing has developed services
and applications which accommodate trust and its related elements. Some elements
which have been addressed thoroughly are reputation, and security credentials. Examples
of reputation-based systems include XREP, NICE, and P-Grid. These systems aggregate
the perception of entities in the system to calculate a local reputation value for a specific
entity. This reputation value is then used in system policy to manage interactions with
entities in the system. Credential-based systems such as X.509, PGP, PolicyMaker, and
KeyNote use credentials to address the trust management problem. The primary
evidence for trust in these credential-based systems is the verification of entity provided
credentials. These systems enable policies which restrict access to services and resources
to verified entities. [35]
While both reputation and credential-based trust management approaches address the
issue of trust in distributed information systems, neither provides a general description of
a trust management system, nor incorporate all of the desirable features found in current
trust management research. A comprehensive description of a general trust management
system is found in the works of Weiliang Zhao, Vijay Varadharajan, and George Brian
[36,37,38,35]. These papers develop a general methodology for modeling trust
relationships and provide a unified framework for trust management. The unified
framework developed incorporates aspects of trust management from a variety of related
research [35].
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Figure 1 Trust Engine Hierarchy

The basic TMS presented by Zhao et al., referred to as TrustEngine, manages trust
through the hierarchy depicted in Figure 1. This architecture incorporates all of the trust
related components which may be separated from applications and handles trust requests
similar to database queries. Input is made to the system as a set containing trustor,
trustee, conditions, and trustee properties. The system will return a value depending on
the input received. An example response is the result of a trust relationship
evaluation [35].
TrustEngine consists of several components which serve trust functions or store trust
data for the system. The TrustDatabase component stores trust relationship information
and trust parameters. This is a persistent storage mechanism for extended storage and
retrieval of trust related information. TrustControl provides overall control of
TrustEngine at runtime by linking applications to the functional packages in TrustEngine.
LocatingTrust performs a direct query of existing trust information from the
TrustDatabase component.
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The EvaluatingTrust component evaluates the current status of a trust relationship.
This evaluation consists of checking whether the conditions of a trust relationship are
satisfied or not. These conditions may be indicators of malicious behavior or
environmental factors, and can be computed by multiple trust mechanisms. Existing
mechanisms for checking trust conditions such as credential, reputation, or environment
evaluation may be incorporated into the EvaluatuingTrust component.
ConsumingTrust handles the EvaluatingTrust component output. This is necessary as
not all trust evaluations will be consumed immediately. Additionally, the evaluation
output may require specific formatting for use by the requesting application which is
handled by the ConsumingTrust component.
2.7.2 Trust Management System Design Principles.
The following is a discussion of trust management concepts as it relates to distributed
information systems put in the context of satellite telecommanding. Trust has become an
intrinsic part of other distributed information technology areas such as e-Business [33],
and critical infrastructure protection [39]. The nature of satellite telecommanding studied
here closely resembles the definition of a distributed information system utilizing the
client-server model [40]. With this relationship, models for trust management and design
principles in distributed information systems will be applied to telecommanding (message
passing) for satellite systems.
Weiliang Zhao and Vijay Varadharajan presented a unified trust management
framework which introduced general characteristics for consideration in TMS
development [33]. These TMS characteristics as they relate to satellite systems are:
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Multiple Trust Mechanisms:
Trust can be established between entities by various methods. These methods are

modeled in the TMS with specific trust mechanisms. Examples of trust mechanisms
are credential verification trust, reputation-based trust, and trust derived from local
data. TMSs can incorporate multiple trust mechanisms in concert for a single trust
decision regarding a complex trust relationship [33]. Without multiple trust
mechanisms, a TMS is limited to modeling simple relationships. These simple
relationships are commonly handled by an authentication protocol or other security
mechanism.


Open Nature:
Satellite telecommand systems are open to all wireless transmissions, allowing

everyone to access the satellite's physical channel remotely. As the system is open,
trust relationships must be defined for known and unknown entities accessing the
system. The open nature of wireless telecommand links makes trust management a
crucial part of the entire system [33].


Multiple Domains:
Operations involving satellite telecommanding often span several networks with

organizational, physical, and logical boundaries. The interconnection of these
networks can be hierarchical or parallel. For example, a satellite control network is
used to command a single satellite. The satellite control network consists of
command terminals which are remotely located from the uplink facility transmitting
signals to the satellite. The remote command terminals access the uplink facility
through a terrestrial communications network. In this case, there is a hierarchical
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relationship between the remote command terminal and uplink facility sending
signals to the satellite. There is a parallel relationship between multiple ground
transmission sites. Trust relationships can be complex in the entire telecommanding
system. Issues can arise in cross-boundary operations, management, and
administration [33].


Real-Time Trust:
For most distributed information systems, real time evaluations are required for

trust relationships. This is also true for satellite telecommanding systems. The
dynamic trust relationships in satellite telecommanding require a real time evaluation
of trust in any TMS being applied. In order to facilitate this real time trust evaluation,
evidence used to calculate trust must be collected and made immediately available for
a trust determination. An analysis of the relevant time frame for this trust evaluation
must be conducted to ensure a "current" trust result is being used when necessary [33].


Scalability:
Each distributed system has a scale at which it operates. A TMS implementation

must be able to scale to meet the maximum requirements of the distributed system.
The scale involved with traditional satellite commanding architectures is relatively
small compared to web-based distributed systems [33].


Complexity:
Complexity in modern distributed information systems is increased by

complicated business functions and advanced technology employed in the
architecture of such systems. TMSs introduced to or developed in these systems must
be capable of matching and modeling the complex trust relationships involved [33].
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The above items describe key areas which should be considered for trust management
in distributed information systems. These characteristics are evaluated in this work for
the development and implementation of a TMS for satellite telecommanding.
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III. Methodology

3.1 Methodology Overview
This thesis addresses threats to the security of satellite command links through the
development of a multi-mechanism Trust Management System (TMS) for satellite Flight
Software (FSW). The previous chapter discusses the basic domain of satellite systems,
general trust management, and computer security concepts. This chapter covers the
development of a TMS incorporating interaction, policy and credential-based trust.
Additionally, a satellite commanding abuse case is formulated to test the TMS. The
developed TMS and formulated abuse case will then be applied to a FSW model where
comparison is made between a FSW operating with and without the TMS. This chapter
presents the motivation for, and explanation of key design features of the Consolidated
Trust Management System (CTMS), a multi-mechanism TMS for application in satellite
FSW. The definitions and assumptions associated with the CTMS, FSW model, and
abuse case are also presented.

3.2 Problem Definition
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The work presented by Zhao and Varadharajan [33] detailing a unified trust
management framework provides a high-level architecture, considerations, and theory
from which a TMS is developed. Additionally, the documentation related to the KeyNote
TMS [41] [42] provides an excellent example of implementing a TMS, although it is
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limited to credential and policy evaluation. With the framework provided by Zhao and
Varadharajan and the implementation lessons from the KeyNote documentation, a new
TMS is developed to handle the complex trust requirements in satellite FSW.
This new TMS will be referred to as the Consolidated Trust Management System
(CTMS), and incorporates multiple trust mechanisms and policies. It is hypothesized that
the CTMS will enhance security in FSW telecommanding by allowing the detection of
anomalous behavior from the FSW's perspective. The goal is to determine if the CTMS
running within the FSW can detect the activities of a malicious ground station and
respond with a pre-programmed policy and trust thresholds.
3.2.2 Approach.
To design an effective TMS for FSW telecommanding that will detect anomalous
behavior, the multiple trust mechanism TMS framework proposed by Zhao and
Varadharajan will be implemented with an architecture similar to that of the KeyNote
TMS [33,41,42]. Additionally, the method for calculation of an Interaction Trust
(I-Trust) value as proposed by Bin Yu and Munindar Singh will be adapted to provide a
quantitative measure of I-Trust for entities in the system [43]. The I-Trust algorithm
from Yu and Singh is extended to provide a more descriptive measure of I-Trust by
basing the trust value calculation on a specific marker associated with system
interactions, see Section 3.3.3.1. This I-Trust value is used as a component in the final
trust evaluation of an entity, see Section 3.3.4. The I-Trust calculation and management
of I-Trust values will exist as a trust mechanism within the CTMS, see Section 3.3.2.
An I-Trust marker is a class of evidence in the system which is collected by observing
interactions with an entity. One example of a trust marker in FSW is the command
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authentication counter check result. Each command contains a value for the command
counter which is compared with the satellites onboard value upon receipt. This check is
the authentication counter trust marker and is modified based upon cooperation or
defection interactions with the system. Additional markers can be associated with a
single transaction, such as message size, or argument validation checks.
With the CTMS developed, a satellite commanding abuse case is formulated as a
basis to generate policies and identify interaction markers for tracking within the system.
The abuse case is a specific instance of a threat action or attack scenario applied to the
satellite FSW system. An analysis of space mission threats is combined with a working
FSW model to formulate specific abuse case for the system, see Section 3.4 and 4.4.
With an abuse case and CTMS complete, a test setup is established which runs FSW
in an emulated environment. The test setup includes original ground station software for
normal commanding operations and custom ground station software to apply the abuse
case. From the test setup, comparisons are made between FSW with trust management
principles applied and basic FSW with no trust management. Additionally, variations on
policy options within the CTMS are compared to highlight their effectiveness and impact
on the system.

3.3 Trust Management System
3.3.1 Services.
The CTMS serves as an engine for tracking and evaluating complex trust
relationships in satellite FSW. The functionality of the CTMS is used as a security
mechanism to support the three computer security services of confidentiality, integrity,
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and availability [32]. With a given system security policy, the CTMS acting as a security
mechanism can be implemented to prevent, detect, or recover from attacks waged on the
system [32]. This allows CMTS to monitor and support the three computer security
services.
The CTMS architecture supports the confidentiality of a system by monitoring
interactions secured through cryptographic means for activity which would be indicative
of a key compromise. An example of such activity would be repetitive failures to
successfully validate the command authentication counter. This activity could simply be
logged for detection, or further compromise could be prevented by discontinuing use of
the potentially compromised key. Furthermore, the CTMS architecture can be used to
initiate telemetry notification of the event using a secure backup key.
System integrity is supported by monitoring interactions with ground stations and
components aboard the spacecraft for potentially corrupt data. The corrupt data could be
improperly formatted messages or erroneous telemetry values. The CTMS architecture
could be used to detect or prevent this activity. Additionally, recovery features can be
initiated through the CTMS. Logging the activity being monitored provides detection
services. Further corruption can be prevented by discontinuing use of the corrupted data.
Additionally, system integrity could be recovered by rebuilding corrupt data from a valid
checksum.
CTMS functions can also secure satellite system availability by maintaining trust
relationships between the FSW and components in the untrusted environment. If these
trust relationships are degraded, the FSW can fall back to a safe state, thus preserving
system availability for recovery operations. This functionality, provided by the trust
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management system, stems from and can be extended through the addition of trust
mechanisms within the CTMS architecture.
3.3.2 Architecture.
The CTMS architecture and implementation are primarily derived from the KeyNote
TMS documentation [44], while the concept of multiple trust mechanisms and additional
trust management theory stems from Zhao and Varadharajan's trust management
framework [33]. The development of the CTMS architecture considers the major
characteristics for trust management systems from Zhao and Varadharajan [33] as they
relate to the trust issues for satellite FSW.
The first characteristic included in CTMS is multiple trust mechanisms. The trust
mechanisms incorporated initially into the CTMS architecture for this work are the
I-Trust and credential trust mechanisms. Additionally, the CTMS architecture is flexible
with the provision for additional trust mechanisms to be added as needed.
The second characteristic considered for the CTMS is to address the open nature of
telecommanding in satellite systems. Illegitimate ground stations can broadcast signals
or commands to an orbiting satellite. This open nature influences the development of a
TMS architecture for satellite FSW and illustrates the need for TMS monitoring of open
interactions.
Authentication mechanisms within the system can be used to filter known from
unknown user communications, but only after some processing of the transmission is
performed. Some FSW systems may not include authentication mechanisms [31]. The
CTMS addresses unauthenticated communications with a trust pool for unregistered users
and handles commands attributed to these entities as anonymous. Without a mechanism
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for authenticating users, to isolate them from the anonymous trust pool, policies cannot
be implemented which discriminate between entities. This issue is addressed with the
credential mechanism in the CTMS architecture.
The third major characteristic of the CTMS is the availability of real-time trust
evaluations. Trust relationships in FSW are continuously changing. An example of the
dynamic trust relationships in satellite systems is demonstrated with the satellite
command link. Messages received through the command link are validated based upon
system parameters resulting in trust evidence from the interaction. This evidence can
indicate a potentially legitimate (cooperation) or malicious (defection) interaction with an
entity. The resulting trust relationship must reflect an entity's cooperation or defection
behavior.
The CTMS architecture provides the capability to dynamically evaluate interactions
based upon markers in the system. These markers are specific characteristics of the
interaction, such as a valid command authentication count. The I-Trust value for an
entity is computed in real-time during interactions and is immediately available as TMS
data. The policy evaluation function then uses this TMS data to compute entity trust
relationships and return a policy compliance status.
The fourth trust management characteristic considered is that of scalability. Within
satellite FSW, the TMS scale is limited by the resources onboard the satellite and the
number of external entities involved in operations. The CTMS architecture can scale to
accommodate varying types and numbers of entities paired with multiple trust
mechanisms and policies. For example, all ground stations expected to communicate
with the satellite can be added to the credential and I-Trust mechanisms. Trust data can
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then be computed individually for each ground station with proper authentication.
Additionally, satellite local entities (onboard components) can each be added as members
in CTMS by establishing an authentication procedure and tracking an I-Trust value for
each identifiable component of interactions with them.
Lastly, the complexity of satellite systems is considered in the CTMS architecture.
The complexity inherent in satellite systems through the incorporation of multiple
advanced technologies influences trust relationships. As the satellite FSW integrates all
spacecraft functions it serves as a mission critical subsystem and hub for processing and
evaluating the trust relationships in the spacecraft. The complexities found in satellite
systems trust relationships, embodied in the FSW, can be modeled with CTMS
components due to its modular design.
From the KeyNote TMS implementation, all TMS functions are contained within the
KeyNote Interpreter. This consolidation of trust management functions allows the TMS
to be implemented with minimal complication to the overall software system. Similarly,
the CTMS functions are implemented outside of the FSW application code. Trust
management operations are accessed with simple function calls to the CTMS. As
requests arrive to applications within the FSW, these applications will make updates to
trust mechanisms as necessary to maintain trust evidence in the system. Before
applications process potentially hazardous external requests, a trust determination is
requested from the CTMS based upon a selected policy.
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All of the considerations for design and implementation details as discussed can be
seen in the general CTMS architecture Figure 2. The general CTMS architecture shows
the integration of trust management modules with the satellite FSW. Additionally,
interactions between the entities and components in the system are shown.
The primary function of the CTMS is to provide policy evaluations based upon trust
evidence within the FSW . The components which provide this capability are the
Interaction Trust Mechanism, Credential Trust Mechanism, Policy Evaluation Function,
and CTMS Application Programming Interface (API).
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Figure 2 General CTMS Architecture
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3.3.3 Trust Mechanisms.
The CTMS architecture is flexible and can employ many trust mechanisms. The
incorporation of additional trust mechanisms to the CTMS allows more complex trust
relationships to be evaluated by system policies. Much like the I-Trust mechanism
monitors the behavior of entities in the system based upon interaction markers; additional
trust mechanisms can be used to determine how entities should be trusted in the system.
One example is an environmental trust mechanism. Environmental parameters can be
evaluated against a standard in real-time with the results being evaluated by system
policy. Policy defines which entities should be trusted in the system and what actions
should be taken considering trust evidence in the system.
3.3.3.1 Interaction Trust Mechanism.
The I-Trust mechanism consists of functions which calculate and maintain I-Trust
values for entities communicating with the FSW. Each entity being tracked by CTMS
can have multiple trust markers associated with it. A separate I-Trust value is calculated
for each marker associated with an entity. These I-Trust values are later used to make
policy determinations in the system.
I-Trust markers are defined as key indicators in the system either inherent to the FSW
or specifically added to characterize entity interactions. As previously indicated, an
example I-Trust marker is the command authentication count field in a command
message. If a message authentication count field does not correspond to the current value
held in the satellites state, it is considered invalid and indicates the receipt of a potentially
malicious command. Other examples of inherent I-Trust markers include command
arguments, command time stamps, and the overall command format.
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An example of an I-Trust marker added to the system specifically for the purpose of
trust calculation is a consecutive command failure counter. This counter would be
checked against a maximum threshold and an I-Trust value would be calculated based
upon this marker. System policies can then make references to the I-Trust value
computed based upon the consecutive command failure marker. An example policy
using this marker is to generate an alert log entry with the date and time of the failed
attempts. This log would be reviewed by satellite controllers for further investigation.
The I-Trust value calculation algorithm used in the I-Trust mechanism is largely
based upon the work of Yu and Singh in the field of reputation management in electronic
communities (social interaction) [43]. The I-Trust value presented here is applied to the
communications in FSW and calculates an I-Trust value based upon a series of
interactions. The resulting trust value is then compared with a policy limit on trust
regarding the monitored marker (this limit is set for each marker in a trust policy). The
result of an I-Trust value check is a trust rating for the marker, which contributes to the
entity's overall trust rating. This marker trust rating is considered in an active system
policy which determines how the system will react to low trust interactions.
To achieve the previously described trust-based policy enforcement, an I-Trust value
is defined.
DEFINITION 1:

T jx is the trust value assigned by the I-Trust mechanism to entity j

for interaction marker x. It is required that -1 <

T jx < 1 and T jx

is initialized to zero.

The I-Trust mechanism calculates a trust value for entity j based upon its observation
of interactions involving entity j affecting marker x. Cooperation is an instance of system
interaction in which the trust marker in question is positively affected; meaning the
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marker indicates legitimate activity. A cooperation interaction by entity j results in a net
increase of the trust value with the factor α, while defection reduces the trust value with
the factor β. The positive and negative associations for α and β require α ≥ 0 and β ≤ 0.
The specific magnitudes of α and β are determined by the nature of the interactions
taking place which modify the trust marker. Typically, trust relationships are such that
trust is hard to gain and easy to lose. This results in the relationship |α| < |β|. The values
of α and β can be either static or dynamic depending on the nature of the environment to
which the trust system is being applied [43]. Further detail regarding the selection of
suitable α and β values for the command authentication count I-Trust marker is presented
in Chapter IV.
DEFINITION 2: After an interaction, the resultant trust value

T jx'

is calculated by

the algorithm presented in Table 1 which considers the previous trust value

T jx .

Table 1 Simple Interaction Trust Algorithm [43]

T jx
<0

>0

=0

Cooperation interaction by j

T  T jx   (1  T jx )
'
jx

T 
'
jx

T jx  
1  min( T jx ,  )



Defection interaction by j

T 
'
jx

T jx  
1  min( T jx ,  )

T jx'  T jx   (1  T jx )
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Table 1 presents the algorithm for computing interaction trust, which will be referred
to as the simple I-Trust algorithm. Following the work of Abari and White, the simple
interaction trust algorithm was tested against a confidence attack [45]. This initial testing
was performed to gain an understanding of the simple interaction trust algorithm and to
characterize it's performance under a specific attack scenario.
A confidence attack, or con man attack is a sequence of interactions where an entity
conducts a series of consecutive cooperation interactions to elevate an associated trust
rating in the system. These cooperation interactions are followed by a single defection
interaction, which would result in a benefit to the con man (malicious) entity. This
defection interaction also lowers the system trust value for the con man. The attackers
intended result of this activity is the systems continued processing of defection
interactions resulting in a net benefit to the attacker.
An initial analysis of the simple trust value calculation was performed by simulating a
number of cooperation and defection interactions with entity j. These interaction
sequences were based upon the concept of a con man attack where entity j interacts
cooperatively Θ times before a single defection. This Simple Con man Attack (SCA(Θ))
pattern was repeated for 250 individual interactions with a graph of the calculated trust
values shown in Figure 3 [45].

45

Simple Interaction Trust and Confdence Attack
Alpha = .05, Beta = ‐.5

1

0.5

SCA(5)

I‐Trust
Value

SCA(10)

0

SCA(20)

SCA(15)

‐0.5

‐1
0

50

100

150

200

250

Interaction Number

Figure 3 Simple Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack
Figure 3 displays a graph of calculated I-Trust values throughout four different con
man attack patterns. The interaction trust values for each attack pattern begin at the
initialized value of zero. The interaction trust values for each pattern increase with the
initial cooperation interactions and subsequently drop at the first defection interaction.
For SCA(5) the interaction trust value reaches 0.23 before the first defection interaction,
which results in an interaction trust value of -0.35. With SCA(20), 20 cooperation
interactions are calculated before the initial defection interaction is processed. The
interaction trust value for SCA(20) before the initial defection interaction is 0.64 and is
0.28 after. Figure 3 shows the simple interaction trust value can converge to a high value
with extended intervals between defection interactions [45].
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This characteristic of the simple interaction trust algorithm to maintain a steady
positive trust value with a known number of defection interactions is important to
modeling certain trust relationships. In particular, this method is used to model trust
relationships between a satellite and ground stations based upon the command
authentication count marker. This is due to the nature of satellite telecommanding where
legitimate ground stations may have a number of defection interactions during a
telecommanding encounter.
To make the system of trust value calculation resistant to potential confidence attacks,
values of α and β may be dynamically adjusted based upon entity interaction and the
current trust value. This method follows work presented by Abari and White [45].
The initial value for α is preserved as α0 during the entire series of interactions by the
I-Trust mechanism. The algorithm for α and β determination to achieve a con-resistant
trust value calculation is shown in Table 2. The algorithm described in Definition 3
along with the trust calculation in Table 1 and Table 2 will be referred to as the extended
I-Trust algorithm.
DEFINITION 3: α and β are determined for con-resistant trust value calculation by
the algorithm in Table 2, where C is a constant 0 < C ≤ 1:
Table 2 Extended Interaction Trust Algorithm

Cooperation interaction by j

Defection interaction by j

  min(   c ( 0   ),  0 )

 c  1 

   (1   )
     d (1   )

 d  C  T jx
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Figure 4 is a plot containing the basic test results of the extended I-Trust algorithm
during a confidence attack. The interaction patterns used in this initial evaluation of the
extended I-Trust algorithm are the same as those used for the simple I-Trust algorithm
shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows the I-Trust values are more severely impacted by
defection activity and none of the interaction patterns converge to a high trust value. The
extended interaction trust algorithm may be suitable for interactions which provide
benefit to malicious entities for repeated abuse.
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Figure 4 Extended Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack
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For the I-Trust mechanism, the I-Trust value corresponding to each marker tracked
for entities in the system is initialized to zero. The I-Trust value alone may not provide
enough information determine how an entity will be trusted by the system. This value is
simply an indicator of one entity’s behavior based upon evidence concerning a specific
trust marker. How the I-Trust value will be interpreted is up to the system policy
utilizing the value, see Section 3.3.4.
Applications within the FSW call upon to the I-Trust Mechanism to update trust
evidence based on system interactions. Once an interaction has been sent to the I-Trust
mechanism, system policy can be evaluated based upon the current system status. FSW
applications use the result of the system policy evaluation to process interactions.
The system policy making use of I-Trust values defines a threshold for acceptance.
The threat being addressed by any policy must be characterized and resulting parameters
required for I-Trust calculation must be established by the developer. To properly
identify the threat, the I-Trust calculation must fit within the threat model and accepted
use of the system. Chapter IV and Appendix A provides additional discussion relating to
system characterization and policy determination to mitigate threats to satellite systems
with the CTMS architecture.
3.3.3.2 Credential Trust Mechanism.
The credential trust mechanism processes authentication credentials to provide
cryptographic authentication within the FSW. The use of cryptographic authentication
identifies entities with a high degree of assurance. The credential trust mechanism can be
implemented with any one or a number of different authentication protocols. The
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CCSDS has recommended the HMAC authentication algorithm SHA-1 as a standard for
message authentication in satellite systems [30].
Some satellite FSW does not have authentication services included in system
code [31]. Authentication services can be integrated into FSW with a robust TMS
architecture or dedicated authentication service. A dedicated authentication service
would require developers to implement an authentication protocol and integrate its
functionality into the FSW. The credential trust mechanism in the CTMS architecture
provides entity authentication for the FSW through standard function calls. This
mechanism will receive a credential provided by an entity and determines if the
credential is valid thereby identifying the entity. With user (entity) authentication
available to the FSW, policies can be implemented which consider the authentication
status of entities interacting with the system. This authentication is critical to the
performance of security related protection functions with CTMS architecture.
3.3.4 Policy Evaluation.
The CTMS serves as a security mechanism by evaluating the systems security policy.
These evaluations are performed by the policy evaluation function in the CTMS
architecture. This function requires the system security policy to be stated in quantifiable
terms which can then be evaluated for compliance. Additionally, the policy evaluation
function must have access to the objects and variables referenced in the system security
policy.
The policies evaluated can model complex trust relationships making full use of all
trust mechanisms and trust evidence collected in the system. The result returned from the
policy evaluation function is used in the FSW application as the final trust rating for the
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entity in question. The policy evaluation function gives FSW applications a mechanism
for enforcing system security policies.
3.3.5 Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) API.
In order for FSW applications to make use of the trust management system, the
CTMS Application Programming Interface (API) must be incorporated into application
code. The CTMS API consists of function specifications which are used to update trust
evidence information in trust mechanisms, gather information from trust mechanisms,
and request policy evaluations. The API also specifies where CTMS functions should be
placed in application code to perform the desired trust management activity. With the
applications making use of the CTMS API, trust evidence and policy evaluations may be
processed in the FSW.

3.4 Abuse Case Development
The specification of an abuse case describes a complete and detailed set of
interactions that result in actual harm to the system. A maximal abuse case has been
characterized as gaining complete control of the system through an abuse of privileges.
The maximal abuse is not always necessary to characterize an abuse of the system.
Simple abuses minimally compromise the privilege necessary to accomplish an intended
harm on the system [46].
Within an abuse case, actors are described by their characteristics. The critical
characteristics necessary for modeling an actor in an abuse case include the actors
resources, skills, and objectives [46]. For this work, actors in the satellite
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telecommanding abuse case must be modeled with characteristics relevant to the satellite
systems domain.
The purpose of an abuse case is to describe a family of undesirable interactions with
the goal of reducing security requirement oversights and design flaws. The abuse case
definition includes many abstract transactions which may be used to accomplish a single
abuse of the system [46]. Specific features or components in a system which may be
exploited are selected and included in the abuse cases description.
The concept for a satellite commanding abuse case is derived from the CCSDS report
concerning threats to space systems and known computer system intrusion techniques [6].
Additionally, related research on telecommanding security refers to a specific attack case
for satellite commanding communications.
The related attack case involves a malicious entity attempting unauthorized access to
a satellite command link through a forgery attack. This forgery attack requires an
attacker to possess knowledge about the spacecrafts orbital and physical channel access
parameters. Additionally, the attacker is modeled to have access to the command
message structure, and can transmit modified messages to the satellite [47].
The steps of the referenced forgery attack begin with the attacker intercepting
legitimate satellite command messages. These messages are then analyzed for the
underlying protocols. Once identified, fields in the message relating to satellite access
are modified in a manner which will allow the attacker to successfully command the
satellite [47].
The objective of the attacker in the previous scenario is to gain control of the satellite.
It is this activity that this thesis serves to address with the CTMS architecture. Further
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discussion regarding the specific forgery attack satellite telecommanding abuse case used
in this work is presented in Chapter IV.

3.5 System Policy Development
The system policy used in this research will be based upon the abuse case activities
being tested in the system. Through this relationship, system policy plays a critical part
in addressing security in the satellite system. One of the primary benefits of CTMS is to
provide mechanisms with which to implement system policy. For example, the CTMS
interaction trust mechanism will allow system policies to be implemented which take into
consideration a users interactions. Additionally, the system policies used for testing are
designed to demonstrate the logging, detection, and prevention of malicious activities
utilizing the CTMS.

3.6 Satellite Test Environment
A functional satellite system is required to support implementation of the CTMS
architecture to satisfy the goal of this thesis. The final implementation and associated
testing demonstrates the feasibility of the CTMS architecture. This testing is also
performed to demonstrate the use of a CTMS implementation to support satellite system
security. The necessary components for constructing this system are, realistic satellite
FSW, realistic FSW executing environment, and a functional ground station to
communicate with the emulated satellite.
An example of such a satellite system test environment known as the Flight-Cyber
Vulnerability Assessment Testbed has been developed and implemented by the Aerospace
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Corporation (funded by the USAF and Aerospace Internal Research and Development)
[48]. The vulnerability assessment testbed was developed to perform specific
experiments supporting vulnerability assessments for USAF programs of record. The
vulnerability assessment testbed consists of two major components, the Unit Under Test
(UUT), and testbed supporting infrastructure. The UUT is the satellite being tested, and
is the subject for experimentation. The testbed supporting infrastructure provides all
necessary hardware and software to communicate or otherwise interface with the
UUT [48].
The satellite test environment developed for this research includes the major
components found in the Aerospace testbed. This research testbed is required to support
CTMS testing once integrated into a satellite system. The testbed components used in
this work were selected to provide a realistic environment for satellite FSW security
testing. My test environment implementation details, including FSW development,
ground station setup, and test components, are presented in Chapter IV.

3.7 Summary
This chapter presents the design features of the CTMS for application to satellite
FSW. CTMS represents a unification of trust management theory and exiting TMS
implementation architecture for the purpose of enhancing satellite system security. The
approach of CTMS is to merge concepts from a generic TMS framework into satellite
FSW to mitigate threats associated with a specific abuse case.
The CTMS architecture incorporates multiple trust mechanisms and a policy
evaluation function to perform trust evaluations of entities within FSW. The I-Trust
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mechanisms fundamental objective is calculating trust values for entities based upon
specific interaction markers. The credential trust mechanism provides authentication by
evaluating credentials provided by entities in the system. The component trust values and
information within the FSW are used by the policy evaluation function to define the
systems response to activity in the system. The CTMS API is used to access this
functionality from satellite FSW applications.
The concept of abuse case modeling is applied to the satellite FSW to test the security
of critical components and to evaluate the CTMS. System policy follows the abuse case
to detect and prevent malicious activities. Additionally, the specification of a satellite
test environment is presented to serve as a realistic proof of concept for the application of
trust management practices to secure satellite systems.
In summation, the CTMS architecture once implemented is expected to improve
security in satellite systems by detecting and preventing specific abuse cases. In order to
evaluate the feasibility and performance of the CTMS architecture, Chapter IV presents a
CTMS implementation in realistic satellite FSW. Finally, Chapter IV describes testing of
the CTMS implementation with an abuse case and system policy.
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IV. Analysis and Results

4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter documents the study of how trust management concepts can be used to
protect a satellite system from a specific abuse case. Satellite system protection is shown
as the outcome of abuse case testing on satellite Flight Software (FSW). The specific
trust mechanisms within the Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS)
architecture are characterized to determine their suitability for implementation in actual
systems. Additionally, implementation specific results of FSW performance are
presented to demonstrate the feasibility of trust management integration into satellite
systems.
The goal of the current experimentation is to determine the applicability of trust
management concepts in general, and CTMS specifically, to address satellite system
threats embodied in the forgery attack abuse case. The primary hypothesis is that the
CTMS will improve security in FSW telecommanding. This improvement in security is
measured through the detection and prevention of a forgery attack with the CTMS.
This research does not focus on completely securing the satellite system emulated in
the test environment; rather, it develops a methodology which can address specific
concerns regarding satellite security. This methodology includes a specific architecture
with which to incorporate trust management concepts into satellite system FSW. The
experiments designed for this research apply the abuse case, system policy, and CTMS to
the existing FSW as a proof of concept.
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4.2 Test Environment Setup
A functional satellite system is required to perform the work set forth in this thesis.
To serve as a functional model of a satellite system, realistic FSW, dedicated flight
hardware, and satellite commanding ground station software have been acquired and
configured to emulate a satellite system. An overall view of the satellite system emulated
to conduct this work is shown in Figure 5.
The satellite system consists of a single satellite, and two command ground stations.
One of the command ground stations serves as a legitimate ground station which is
authorized to command the satellite. The second is a malicious ground station which will
perform attack behavior as described in the abuse case.

Satellite:
8051TB
CubeSat Flight Software

Command / Telemetry:
USB ‐> TTL Cable

Malicious Commands:
USB ‐> RS232

Legitimate Ground Station
Ground Station Hardware / Software:
Virtual Machine
CGA

Malicious Ground Station
Ground Station Hardware / Software:
Virtual Machine
Custom Commanding Tool

Figure 5 Test Satellite System
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The satellite hardware is emulated with a microcontroller Test Board (TB) which is
logically identical to the flight processor and memory for some CubeSat missions. The
microcontroller test board contains a processor which runs the 8051 instruction set.
Along with the 8051 CPU, memory and digital communication peripherals are located on
the TB. The primary communication peripheral used is a Universal Asynchronous
Receiver Transmitter (UART) which is connected to a Recommended Standard 232
(RS232) transceiver onboard [49].
The ground station hardware consists of a single computer workstation. The
computer workstation divides and shares hardware resources with multiple virtual
computer workstations (virtual machines). These virtual machines run the command
ground station software which communicates with the emulated satellite/TB.
The ground stations utilize USB ports and signal converters to connect with the RS232
port on the TB.
The legitimate command ground station in the satellite system is modeled by a virtual
machine running Common Ground Architecture (CGA). Mission unique components
present in CGA were specifically designed to interact with the FSW. The CGA ground
station receives telemetry from the satellite and displays system status in formatted
tables. Additionally, commands can be sent from the CGA ground station to demonstrate
functionality of the satellite FSW and hardware in the emulated environment.
The malicious ground station in the satellite system is implemented by custom
commanding software. This commanding software was written to communicate with the
satellite and perform malicious actions as described by the satellite commanding abuse
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case. The custom commanding software also implements new commands added to the
FSW in conjunction with this thesis research.
The satellite FSW is modeled after software currently operating on CubeSat missions.
The FSW is written in the C programming language with specific 8051 assembly code for
system initialization and critical operations. The FSW was developed in the Keil
Integrated Development Environment (IDE); which manages source code and compiles,
links, and flashes complete software to the TB.
To facilitate debugging of the system and to view transmissions between ground
stations and satellite, a logic analyzer was connected to monitor UART signals on the test
board. The logic analyzer used for this testing was a USBee ZX module which reports
the transmit and receive signals on the communication path between the TB and ground
stations. The entire test environment setup described is shown in Figure 6.
Additional debugging and data output from experimentation was provided by a
diagnostic port on the TB. This port served as a window into the operation of the FSW
and reported real time system status directly from the TB. CTMS and FSW status was
observed from this port along with any system errors generated during testing. An
illustrated test using this setup is presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 6 Test Environment Setup

4.3 Trust Management System Integration
The CTMS architecture discussed in Section 3.3.2 is integrated into the CubeSat FSW
directly. The CTMS consists of functions written in the C programming language, which
are compiled into the FSW. These functions are referenced by FSW applications with the
CTMS API to handle trust management tasks. The modified FSW containing CTMS
Application Programming Interface (API) calls, CTMS functions, and system policy are
then compiled to a single binary and flashed onto the 8051 test board.
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These actions would be accomplished during the development and testing phase for
actual satellite mission. The complete satellite and FSW incorporating all safety and
security features would be fully integrated and tested prior to launch. The following
subsections describe the setup and operation of the two trust mechanisms, CTMS data
storage, policy evaluation function, and CTMS API.
4.3.1 Interaction-Based Trust Calculation.
Calculations for interaction-based trust used in the CTMS implementation are
performed as described in Section 3.3.3.1, with static values for α and β. The I-Trust
values are calculated for every command interaction, however, cannot be attributed to
specific actors due to lack of user authentication in the basic FSW. The lack of
authentication leads to I-Trust values which characterize the trust of anonymous entities
in the system. The resultant I-Trust values are used in conjunction with system policy to
make a final trust determination and define the systems response commands being
received from anonymous entities.
The command access security policies defines threshold values for I-Trust and states
how these values will be acted upon in the system, see Section 4.5. The first step in
setting up this policy is to configure the I-Trust mechanism. The initial I-Trust
parameters are set to (T = 0,α = 0.05, β = -0.2) for the command authentication count
marker based upon an initial characterization of the I-Trust algorithm. Further discussion
regarding the optimization of simple I-Trust parameters is found in Appendix A. With
these parameters set, the I-Trust value for this marker will fall below -0.5 after four
consecutive defective interactions. Section 4.7.2 discusses in detail the rationale behind
why these parameters were chosen and their effect on the system.
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The only I-Trust marker utilized during experimentation was the command
authentication count marker. Additional markers were considered, however were not
utilized for experimentation. Table 3 shows a list of markers which may be used in the
CTMS system as implemented in this work.
Table 3 CTMS I-Trust Marker List
Marker
Authentication Counter
Check Vector
Current Password

Evidence
Identify poor connection or attempt on
authentication counter
Identify attempt on authentication crypto
key
Identify attempt on password, indicates
compromised authentication crypto key

Attributable
NO*
NO
YES**

* If the command authentication counter is checked after credential trust
authentication of a message the command authentication attempt can be attributed.
** If the credential trust mechanism identifies an invalid password after successfully
comparing the check vector then the attempt is attributed to the crypto key used to
encrypt the credential.

Both the simple and extended algorithms for calculating interaction trust were
implemented in the course of this work. Only the simple interaction trust algorithm was
suitable for computing interaction trust using the authentication count marker. This is
due to the nature of the radio link used for satellite commanding, which is discussed
further in Section 4.7.1.
The simple interaction trust algorithm is suited for characterization of interactions
with no incentive for repeated abuse after positive interactions. This is the case for
satellite commanding and the command authentication counter. The extended trust
algorithm may work well for interactions which benefit the attacker for presenting
defective interactions after consecutive cooperation interactions. This would be suitable
for the protection of features prone to repeated abuse, i.e., the attacker gets benefit from
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failing the marker check. One example in the context of satellite systems would be for an
attacker, once gaining access, to probe a satellite with known good commands for a
number of interactions and then send a malformed command in an effort to disrupt the
satellite.
4.3.2 Credential Trust Evaluation.
The credential trust mechanism implemented for experimentation utilized the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptography algorithm published in the Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197 [50]. The AES source code used in
this work was adapted from an open source implementation by Niyaz PK [51]. With the
AES algorithm implemented as part of the CTMS, cryptographic verification of an
authentication credential was possible in the FSW.
AES was selected to provide cryptographic authentication due to its availability and
the possibility for re-use in the system. The AES functions implemented for
authentication can also be used to add encryption to the commanding or telemetry
communications to and from the satellite. Additionally, AES is the CCSDS proposed
standard for encryption in satellite systems [30]. With a cryptographic algorithm
implemented, an authentication credential was developed for processing by the credential
trust mechanism.
The authentication credential introduced for testing purposes consisted of the
following elements: key index, check vector, and an encrypted password component.
The key index was a value used to select the AES key for decryption of the password
component of the credential. The check vector was a random value used to introduce a
random component to the message and to serve as a check upon decryption of the
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password component. The encrypted password component of the authentication
credential consisted of a check vector, current authentication nonce, and next
authentication nonce. Figure 7 shows the structure of the authentication credential.
The check vector in the encrypted password component was set to the same value as
the vector in the authentication credential. Upon decryption, the check vector from the
encrypted password component was compared with the check vector from the
authentication credential. If the two vectors matched, the message was properly decoded
with the key identified by the key index. A positive check of the initialization vector is
the result of a valid entity passing the credential or an invalid entity replaying the
credential.

Figure 7 Authentication Credential Structure

The current nonce field in a credential was compared with the identification nonce
stored in the credential trust mechanism. If the current nonce from the encrypted
password component matches the internal identification nonce, then the credential is
deemed to be valid. Each key index had an identification nonce associated with it for
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entity identification. A valid check of the credential was then associated with the key
index and any activity related to this credential was attributed to the associated key index.
The next nonce field contained the value to be stored as the identification nonce in the
credential trust mechanism for the given key index. The identification nonce was
replaced with the next nonce value after processing the current credential. The next
nonce must be different from the current nonce. If the current and next nonce are the
same value in this system, the authentication credential could be successfully validated
during a replay.
With the credential trust mechanism, CTMS can validate entities in the system and
associate them with trust information. Entities authenticated by the credential trust
mechanism were associated with CTMS members as defined in Table 4. Additionally,
secure functionality can be built into the system, which can be used to mitigate system
threats. An example of this is demonstrated by the experiments presented in Section 4.6.
Table 4 Credential Trust List
CTMS Member
0 - Anonymous
1 - Administrator

AES Key
Index
N/A
0

Authentication Password
Index
N/A
0

The authentication credential structure and associated validation mechanism was
developed for use in this research as a proof of concept for a generic authentication
mechanism. As such, extensive characterization and cryptanalysis of this implementation
was not performed. A validated cryptographically secure algorithm and implementation
should be used for credential generation and authentication in the credential trust
mechanism for a flight ready system.
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4.3.3 Trust Data Storage.
The Trust Data Storage component of the CTMS was used to maintain the systems
current status. Each entity interacting with the system, whether authenticated or not, was
categorized into CTMS members. The CTMS implementation contained data regarding
CTMS members and their nominal mapping to ground station ID; see Table 5.
Additionally, I-Trust data associated with each marker and entity was also stored in the
Trust Data Storage component; see Table 6.
Table 5 CTMS Member List
CTMS
Member
0
1

Ground Station
ID
0001
0002

Role
Anonymous commanding
Administrator Level Authenticated Commanding

Table 6 I-Trust Member Evidence List
CTMS Member
0 - Anonymous
1 - Administrator

Marker
ID
0

I-Trust Marker
Authentication Count I-Trust Marker Simple

0
1
2

Authentication Count I-Trust Marker Simple
Credential Check Vector I-Trust Marker Simple
Credential Current Password I-Trust Marker Simple

4.3.4 API.
The CTMS API implemented for testing consisted of function prototypes for the
credential trust mechanism, I-Trust mechanism, and policy evaluation function. The
credential trust mechanism returned the credential validation status for a given ground
station ID and credential. The I-Trust mechanism did not return data directly to the
calling function, however, it updated I-Trust data for a given ground station ID, marker
ID and interaction result (cooperation or defection). The policy evaluation function
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returned the result of a policy evaluation for a given ground station ID and policy
identifier.
Specific API calls were made in the command handler application, as it was being
tested by the commanding abuse case. The CTMS API calls implemented in the FSW
command handler application were to the I-Trust mechanism, credential trust mechanism
and policy evaluation function. The I-Trust mechanism was called to update trust
evidence for an entity in the system using the command authentication count marker.
The credential trust mechanism was used to implement the secure unlock command
discussed in Section 4.6. The policy evaluation function was used to prevent the abuse
case presented in Section 4.4.

4.4 Implementation Abuse Case
Normal use for a satellite system requires commands to be transmitted from a ground
station to the satellite. These commands must be processed aboard the satellite to
maintain the system and to perform the primary mission. The design of command
handling systems for satellites which only incorporate this simple use case with little
regard for misuse or abuse of the system may lead to vulnerabilities in the system.
The scenario presented here is the result of applying the abuse case development
methodology presented in Section 3.4 to the system being used to implement and test the
CTMS architecture. This abuse case is modeled for the satellite telecommanding
subsystem. The specific component in the telecommanding subsystem that may be
exploited is the command handler application of the satellite FSW.
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For this case, a third party either has access to command formatting information, or
can intercept transmissions emanating from the primary satellite ground station. Once a
command session has been recorded, satellite specific information is recovered from the
command link data. This information is then replayed with modified/malicious values in
an effort to gain access to the satellite.
The nature of the basic FSW is such that the simple replay of a previously transmitted
authenticated command fails. This is due to the incremental nature of the command
sequence, where previously executed commands will not be processed. These design
characteristics of the FSW, however are vulnerable to a modified replay attack.
The specific abuse case is a forgery attack by a malicious ground station. This
forgery attack is the replay of a previously transmitted legitimate message by an attacker.
In an effort to guess the dynamic command authentication counter onboard the satellite,
the authentication count field for the illegitimate message is incremented during the
replay in an effort to brute force the authentication count in the FSW. The intent is to
have a malicious command processed. See Table 7 for a summary of the steps involved
in the abuse case.
Table 7 Abuse case steps
Step Action
1
Record commanding session or otherwise acquire command header and format
information
2
Transmit desired malicious command in an attempt to have it processed by the
satellite.
3
If the command execution fails at the satellite, increment the authentication count in
the command message and resend.
4
Continue to increment the authentication count in the command sequence until the
command is accepted.
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The abuse case activity described in Table 7 is similar to the model of attack behavior
against a space communication link published by researchers investigating command link
attack detection [47]. This pattern is also similar to that taken by attackers to exploit
terrestrial software and networks [52].

4.5 Implementation System Policy
The system policies defined for this work were formulated to address the satellite
telecommanding forgery attack. The broad system security policy requires only
legitimate commands be processed by the satellite. This security policy must be enforced
by a security mechanism. The CTMS implementation is the security mechanism which
was used to address this broad system security policy in the following experiments.
The detailed system security policies used for CTMS implementation testing are
shown in Table 8. The first system security policy requires an alert to be logged once the
I-Trust value for the authentication count marker reaches -0.5. The result of this policy is
attack activity detection based upon interaction trust calculation. As each command is
received, the I-Trust value is updated based upon a check of the command authentication
count. Failed checks will reduce the I-Trust value, while successful checks increase the
value.
Policy 2 is aimed at preventing the same attack activity detected with Policy 1. Once
the I-Trust value for the general ground station based upon the authentication count
marker reaches -0.5 all commands from anonymous ground stations will be rejected. This
policy results in denying unauthenticated users access to the system. As this policy does
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not specify the authentication of ground stations, it results in denial of service for all
ground stations. This issue is addressed with Policy 3.

Table 8 Implemented Policy Options

Policy

Implications

1. Trust Management Event Logging Only
Description: Command authentication count is checked
upon receipt and I-Trust value is calculated for
authentication count marker. Once the I-Trust value for
authentication count reaches
-0.5 an alert is logged indicating excessive invalid
command attempts.
2. Trust Management Event Logging and Prevention
Description: Command authentication count is checked
upon receipt and I-Trust value is calculated for
authentication count marker. Once the I-Trust value for
authentication count reaches
-0.5 command processing is halted for anonymous users
and an alert is logged indicating excessive invalid
command attempts.

Credential Trust not required
P- fewer satellite resources required
P-legitimate ground station is alerted to
review detailed logs
N-malicious ground station may tamper
with logs if access is acquired

3. Trust Management Event Logging, Prevention and
Recovery
Description: Command authentication count is checked
upon receipt and I-Trust value is calculated for
authentication count marker. Once the I-Trust value for
authentication count reaches
-0.5 command processing is halted for anonymous users
and an alert is logged indicating excessive invalid
command attempts. The legitimate ground station must
unlock satellite commanding and the CTMS via credential
trust mechanism to resume commanding operations.

Credential Trust required

Credential Trust not required
P-malicious behavior is prevented
N-denial of service without entity
authentication

P-legitimate ground station is alerted to
review detailed logs
P-malicious behavior is prevented
P-additional features extend policy and
security options
N- additional satellite resources are
required
N-malicious ground station may tamper
with logs if access is acquired
P - Positive attribute for system policy
N -Negative attribute for system policy

Policy 3 extends the second policy with a provision for resuming satellite
commanding with credential authentication of entities. Again, once the authentication
count I-Trust value reaches -0.5, all commands from anonymous ground stations will be
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rejected until the system state is acknowledged. The system state is acknowledged and
the trust management system is reset by an authenticated user with a secure CTMS
unlock command. This policy and implementation is intended to demonstrate that FSW
with CTMS can detect and respond to a low trust commanding interaction pattern. An
example test of Policy 3 is presented in Appendix B.
The system response based on this policy is defined in the command processing code
(command handler) of the FSW. The command handler filters commands from
un-trusted IDs and logs un-trusted commanding interactions with the CTMS functions.
Logs pertaining to CTMS status are stored and can be relayed via telemetry to ground
controllers.

4.6 Experiment Design
In order to evaluate the performance of the trust management system and implement
command access policies, three FSW builds were developed and tested. The first FSW
build, referred to as the (Basic FSW), is based upon a CubeSat FSW implementation
without trust management. The second FSW build (FSW-A) expands on the Basic FSW
with an initial CTMS implementation and the first two system security policies. The
final FSW build (FSW-B) implements the CTMS architecture including the credential
trust mechanism and the third system security policy.
With the credential trust mechanism, FSW-B implements the third security policy
which requires entity identification. This identification is performed through the addition
of a secure unlock command to the FSW command handler application. The secure
unlock command utilizes the authentication credential presented earlier to identify a
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legitimate ground station and restore access to anonymous commanding of the satellite.
Table 9 illustrates the three FSW builds with their features, policies, and procedures used
for testing.
Table 9 Experiment Design
Basic FSW

Build Features
Basic FSW + No
modifications

Test Policy
Broad System Policy:
Only legitimate ground
stations should command the
satellite
Policy 1 and 2 implemented
with CTMS; see Table 8

FSW-A

Basic FSW + CTMS
without Credential Trust

FSW-B

Policy 3 implemented with
Basic FSW + CTMS
with Credential Trust and CTMS; see Table 8
secure unlock command

Test Procedure
Apply abuse case and
record results

Apply abuse case and
record results for each
policy
Apply abuse case and
record results; execute
secure CTMS reset
command and record
results

The abuse case was presented to each FSW with results shown in Section 4.7. The
outcome of the tests are presented with a focus on determining if an outsider can
successfully intrude on a commanding session or otherwise access the satellite using the
abuse case. An illustrated example of the experiment procedure for FSW-B and Policy 3
is presented in Appendix B.

4.7 Experiment Results
This section presents experimentation results from the abuse case scenarios,
comparing the three FSW builds. Additionally, characteristics of the FSW builds are
presented to support conclusions regarding the feasibility of implementing the CTMS
architecture in satellite systems. Lastly, performance of the implemented CTMS
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architecture is presented as it relates to the accurate detection of the forgery attack on the
satellite system.
The Basic FSW was exposed to the commanding abuse case in the first experiment.
This experiment resulted in a system compromise by the malicious ground station
executing commands on the satellite. This activity is prohibited by the general system
policy which limits access to the legitimate ground station.
FSW-A with Policy 1 was utilized in the second experiment where the satellite was
challenged by the commanding abuse case. The system was again compromised,
however the CTMS implementation successfully reported the malicious activity. The
broad system policy to deny unauthorized access to the satellite was violated, however
test Policy 1 was successfully enforced.
For experiment three, FSW-A with Policy 2 was tested with the forgery attack. The
malicious ground station was unable to execute commands on the satellite. However, by
blocking the malicious ground station Policy 2 also caused a denial of service for all
ground stations. This denial of service is due to the lack of entity authentication in the
FSW-A build. The broad system policy to deny access to malicious ground stations was
enforced along with Policy 2.
The fourth and final experiment utilized the FSW-B build, which implemented
system security Policy 3. When the forgery attack was applied to this FSW build, the
malicious activity was detected through the I-Trust mechanism with the command
authentication count marker. Upon detection of the activity, an alert was logged and
anonymous commanding was disabled. These actions satisfied the general security
policy. A secure CTMS unlock command was then transmitted from a legitimate ground
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station with identifying credential, which was subsequently processed by the satellite.
Normal commanding operations were restored on the satellite with the secure CTMS
unlock command. The fourth experiment demonstrated the FSW-B successfully enforced
Policy 3, which prevented malicious commanding of the satellite. The malicious
commanding activity presented in these experiments is a specific forgery attack presented
in the telecommanding abuse case, Section 4.4. An overview of the experimentation
results for the three FSW builds and policies is shown in Table 10.

Table 10 Experiment Results
FSW Build
Basic FSW

FSW-A

FSW-A

FSW-B

Test Policy
Broad System Policy: Only
legitimate ground stations should
command the satellite
Policy 1:
Trust Management Event Logging
Only;
see Table 8
Policy 2:
Trust Management Event Logging and
Prevention;
see Table 8

Policy 3:
Trust Management Event Logging,
Prevention and Recovery;
see Table 8

Test Results
Broad System Policy: Failure
Note:
malicious ground station gains access
Broad System Policy: Failure
Policy 1 Implementation: Success
Note:
malicious ground station gains access
Broad System Policy: Success
Policy 2 Implementation: Success
Note:
malicious ground station denied
access;
denial of service experienced
Broad System Policy: Success
Policy 3 Implementation: Success
Note:
malicious ground station denied
access

In summary, basic FSW takes no specific action to prevent or report malicious
activity as described in the commanding abuse case. When the abuse case is applied to
the basic FSW, malicious commands are successfully executed when the authentication
counter is reached during the forgery attack. This scenario, when presented to FSW-B is
identified and processing of the malicious commands is prevented. These results serve to
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validate the initial hypothesis that trust management principals can be applied to satellite
systems to detect and prevent malicious activity.

4.7.1 System Performance.
This section discusses the I-Trust mechanism's performance for detecting the forgety
attack abuse case. For satellite commanding operations, signals are transmitted from a
ground station through open space to the satellite orbiting above. This transmission path
has characteristics which affect transmitted messages. The primary factor to be
considered in this research for the command link is the Bit Error Rate (BER).
The command link BER directly affects the number of command messages that are
improperly transmitted to the receiver aboard the satellite. This phenomenon affects both
malicious and legitimate ground stations resulting in legitimate ground stations
occasionally transmitting a command with an invalid command authentication count.
Each satellite system in operation has different satellite commanding procedures and
command link parameters. Both of these factors contribute to the number of commands
received at the satellite with an invalid authentication count.
Due to the nature of satellite commanding in which legitimate commands are lost in
transmission, a simple counter for the number of invalid commands received is not
directly suitable for security monitoring. The I-Trust mechanism utilized in the CTMS
calculates a trust value for entities interacting with the satellite. This value is based upon
the quality of interactions relative to an I-Trust marker. The marker for these interactions
demonstrated in this work is the command authentication count. As previously
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discussed, legitimate and malicious ground stations will present commands with invalid
authentication counts.
The I-Trust mechanism adjusts the trust value for anonymous entities based the
command authentication count field in messages received. An encounter with a
malicious entity is flagged when the I-Trust value falls below a specified threshold value.
This threshold value, along with the parameters that determine the I-Trust mechanisms
operation, must be set according to the specific system in which it is implemented. These
settings are determined based upon the number of commands typically lost during a
commanding session with a legitimate ground station. Appendix A presents a method
and results of optimizing the simple I-Trust algorithm parameters for the command
authentication count marker. The performance characteristics for optimal I-Trust
parameters are also discussed in Appendix A.
4.7.2 System Characteristics.
The primary goal of demonstrating CTMS architecture in an emulated satellite system
environment was to determine the feasibility of implementation in flight ready satellite
systems. The characteristics which contribute to the implementations feasibility are
Software Compile Size, RAM Utilization, and Function Execution Speed. These
characteristics are significant to the implementation of new features into satellite flight
software due to a satellites limited hardware resources. A summary of Compile Size and
RAM utilization for the Basic FSW and FSW-B builds is shown in Table 11.
Additionally, the performance of specific functions which implement the CTMS
architecture is shown in terms of execution time in Table 12.
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Table 11 FSW Build Characteristics
FSW Build
FSW-B
Basic FSW
Difference

Constant Data

Code

RAM

2111 Bytes

61443 Bytes

50725 Bytes

1687 Bytes

51547 Bytes

48600 Bytes

424 Bytes

9896 Bytes

2125 Bytes

Table 12 CTMS Function Performance
CTMS Function
Simple Interaction
Policy Evaluation
Credential Evaluation (AES Decrypt)

Execution Time
2.4 ms
0.76 ms
21 ms

The compiled characteristics for the FSW builds illustrate the increase in memory
usage for an example implementation of the CTMS architecture. Additionally, the
function performance shows the added computational time required to process
interactions, policies, and credentials with the CTMS implementation. The performance
measure taken for the credential evaluation function incorporates the initialization of the
AES cryptography function and decryption of the single block of data in the credential.
Each satellite system has unique requirements for hardware and software
configurations. Engineers must balance these requirements by making decisions as to
which features to implement in the system. Based upon the data presented above, an
initial estimate for the system impacts of adding a TMS to a CubeSat mission is realized.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work

5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the conclusions and implications of this thesis. Conclusions
for this research focus on the primary thesis question. Additionally, ancillary findings
derived from experimentation are discussed. Finally, recommendations for future
research are made.
This work developed a multi mechanism Trust Management System (TMS) to
address cyber threats to satellite systems. Additionally, methods for threat assessment
and vulnerability analysis were presented for use in satellite system development and
testing. Chapter I introduced the research problem and focus. Chapter II presented an
introduction to the satellite system domain along with computer security and trust
management principles. Chapter III covered my approach to the problem and introduced
the proposed TMS architecture for satellite telecommanding. Chapter III also covered
system security policy, telecommanding abuse case, and satellite Flight Software (FSW)
test environment development methodology. Chapter IV presented the test setup used for
experimentation and integration of the Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS)
with satellite FSW. Additionally, Chapter IV illustrated the specific forgery attack
satellite telecommanding abuse case, and policy used for testing the CTMS
implementation. Experiment design, results, and system performance were also
presented in Chapter IV.
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5.2 Conclusions of Research
This thesis demonstrates the development and use of a TMS to detect the presence
of a telecommand forgery attack on satellite FSW. Once detected, the satellite FSW can
log or prevent the attack activity. The advantage of using trust management concepts for
security in satellite systems is their ability to manage data quality, whereas traditional
security mechanisms such as cryptography and access control schemes cannot.
The primary research question of this thesis was to study the application of trust
management concepts from the distributed information systems domain to satellite
telecommanding. This cross application of research was hypothesized to enhance
security in satellite system telecommanding by allowing the detection and denial of
adversaries exploiting the command link. This primary research question was broken
down into smaller tasks or incremental research questions to fully address the complex
nature of the problem.
The first incremental research question was to assess the vulnerability of the basic
FSW used as a model in this work. This was accomplished by implementing the basic
FSW in the emulated satellite system test environment and applying the forgery attack
abuse case. Once the basic FSW was shown to be vulnerable to the forgery attack the
effectiveness of the trust management approach could be measured.
The trust management approach addresses the second incremental research
question of whether a TMS can be used to detect the forgery attack. This question was
addressed by implementing the CTMS architecture in the basic FSW and applying the
forgery attack abuse case. Characterization of the FSW with CTMS demonstrated that
the system could detect the forgery attack event with a high reliability. The performance
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of the CMTS architecture can be tuned based upon the environment in which it is
operating. A method of selecting tuning parameters for the CTMS architecture was
developed and presented in Appendix A for application of the architecture to any specific
satellite system. This flexible performance selection feature of the CTMS makes it a
robust option for threat detection in satellite FSW.
The third incremental research question in support of this thesis addressed the
ability to implement multiple system security policies with the CTMS architecture. The
security policies tested addressed the detection and prevention of the telecommanding
forgery attack. The policies implemented exercised all components of the CTMS
architecture including the Interaction Trust (I-Trust) and credential mechanisms. With
the FSW, CTMS implementation, and system security policies configured, the system
was tested with the telecommand forgery attack. These tests demonstrated that the
CTMS architecture implementation can successfully detect the forgery attack and prevent
the execution of malicious commands transmitted by an attacker. As the basic FSW has
no inherent user authentication, these malicious commands were prevented by denying all
anonymous commands. Notification of the malicious activity and normal system
operation was subsequently recovered through the use of a secure command which
utilizes the credential trust mechanism for authentication.
The tests performed in this work demonstrates how the CTMS architecture can be
used in a satellite system. Through this testing it was shown that the CTMS architecture
can be used to consolidate and provide security functions to FSW applications.
Additionally, the CTMS architecture has demonstrated potential to be used in conjunction
with existing safety and security features found in current satellite systems. An example

80

of these findings is to either merge existing cryptographic authentication with the CTMS
architecture as a new trust mechanism, or to simply apply the CTMS architecture in
parallel with a dedicated authentication protocol. For the case of a parallel
implementation, the authentication protocol would be used to associate entities with trust
evidence within the CTMS and also be used for policy evaluation.
Results from the incremental research questions prove the hypothesis that trust
management principles may be applied to satellite system telecommanding to enhance
security. The work completed in this thesis is the demonstration of a powerful new
satellite security methodology and tool. This approach can not only be used to protect
satellites from the specific forgery attack case presented here, however may be applied as
a method to protect satellites from a wide range of threats.

5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
This work consisted of an effort to bring trust management practices from the
distributed information systems and computer security domain to satellite system FSW.
The concepts presented in this thesis can be extended in several ways.
First, further identification and characterization of satellite system abuse cases
will benefit work towards securing these systems. New abuse cases can then be applied
to satellite systems to identify vulnerabilities, which can then be addressed with trust
management architectures such as CTMS. Second, further characterization of the I-Trust
calculation methods can be performed to better understand how to apply the algorithms to
solve security problems in satellite systems. Finally, a more detailed implementation of
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CTMS could be applied to a FSW with authentication and encryption to further
demonstrate the TMS capabilities in supporting these traditional security mechanisms.
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Appendix A. Simple I-Trust Algorithm Optimization
The command authentication count used in a satellite telecommanding
architecture is primarily a safety feature. The function of the command authentication
count is to identify commands which are received out of sequence. The typical response
to receiving a command with an invalid authentication count is to discard the message.
This response inadvertently addresses commands sent with malicious intent. A third
party whom is unaware of the current command authentication count in the satellite will
be unable to transmit valid commands to be processed by the satellite. This indicates a
potential security benefit of the command authentication count feature.
In order to evaluate the command authentication count for use as a security
mechanism, an analysis of the feature's properties is performed. The first issue addressed
is the probability an attacker will accurately guess the authentication count. Second is
how to detect an attacker attempting to access the system by guessing the authentication
count. Lastly, an analysis of the Interaction Trust (I-Trust) mechanism and optimization
of the I-Trust configuration parameters is presented.
The probability an attacker will guess the authentication count is directly related
to the range of values for the authentication count field. The authentication count used as
16
a demonstration implementation in this work is a 16-bit variable. This results in 2

possible values with a maximum of 65,535 and a minimum of 0. An adversary
attempting to guess this value has a one in 65,536 chance to succeed on the first try.
Using the forgery attack scenario an attacker will choose a value only once and the
probability of correctly selecting the authentication count is computed with Equation 1.
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The number of attempts to guess the authentication count is n and the probability of
success will increase with each attempt. At this rate the attacker must try 656 times to
have approximately 1% chance of guessing the authentication count.
n 1

1
16
x0 2  x

P

Equation 1 Probability

An attacker attempting to access a system utilizing an authentication counter must
first acquire the current authentication count. One attack scenario presented in this work
involves the attacker sending multiple commands with an incrementally different
authentication count for each. This method of starting from an initial value for the
authentication count and making a series of attempts with sequential authentication count
values allows the attacker to cover all values of the authentication counter and access the
satellite.
Abuse of the command authentication with this activity leaves evidence in the
satellite system. This evidence is the pattern and history of commands received by the
system with an invalid authentication count. The evidence will appear differently
depending on whether this attempt is made independent of a legitimate ground station's
telecommanding session or during a legitimate telecommanding session.
Failure to present the proper authentication count can indicate either indicate lost
legitimate commands or the presence of an attacker attempting illegitimate commands.
In order to differentiate between legitimate ground station and attacker in a commanding
encounter, these authentication failures are aggregated with the use of an I-Trust
algorithm. This algorithm computes a value which is an indicator of the reliability or
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trustworthiness of a remote system. The algorithm computes the trust value based upon
an interaction's modification of a specific marker in the system. If the marker indicates
cooperation by the remote system then the interaction trust value is increased.
Conversely, if the marker indicates defection by the remote system the interaction trust
value is reduced. This system of computing a trust value which incorporates the outcome
of interactions is used to detect the presence of an attacker in the system.
The particular algorithm used to perform this trust value calculation is adapted
from the agent rating process presented by Yu and Sing. This algorithm utilizes two
parameters to define how much the trust value should increase or decrease following an
interaction. The environment in which this algorithm is being used will have an effect on
how these parameters should be set. The remainder of this Appendix documents the
characterization of the satellite system telecommanding environment relevant to the
command authentication counter. Additionally, a procedure for optimizing the algorithm
parameters used to detect attack behavior in the command system is presented.
The optimization and characterization of the simple I-Trust algorithm is presented
in the context of malicious activity detection in satellite system telecommanding. The
algorithm parameter optimization is presented in steps to configure the I-Trust algorithm
for a particular satellite system. This procedure was developed after the analysis and
optimization of the algorithm's parameters α and β for a specific satellite system.
The first step to configure the I-Trust algorithm is to establish a desired false
negative threshold. This threshold is based upon the users tolerance for potential false
negatives in the system. For this example, a value of 0.001 is chosen. This indicates that
the user will accept at the very most a one in one thousand chance an attacker will
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succeed unnoticed. This value is used to compute the approximate maximum number of
command attempts which are made during an attack on the system before being detected.
The calculation is performed by multiplying the probability of success by the
number of possible values in the command authentication counter. For my test system,
the command authentication counter is 16 bits, which results in 65,536 possible values.
See Figure 8 Attempt Approximation Formula for the approximation formula and
example computation. Alternatively, the user may pick the number of attempts an
attacker may make on the system and compute the false negative probability.

1
2b
n  P ( x )  2b
n  (.001)  65,536
n  65
P( x)  n

Figure 8 Attempt Approximation Formula

The second step in configuring optimal parameters for the I-Trust algorithm is to
establish a system security policy, which sets a threshold on the I-Trust value. This
policy limit value is also related to the security posture of the system. A high value (less
negative) will result in a sensitive system, which is in turn more susceptible to false
positives. A low value will result in a system which requires higher penalties to reach the
policy limit. This is due to the requirement to identify malicious behavior within the
number of defection interactions calculated in step one.
The value of -0.8 was chosen and is used here as it falls just below the
approximately linear portion of the trust curve for a series of defection interactions. This
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is best illustrated by the attack curve in Figure 17. A policy limit at the end of this
approximately linear portion of the curve allows the system to accommodate both a high
security posture and low false positive rate.
With the chosen security policy limit on the I-Trust value, the third step to
configure the I-Trust mechanism is to establish a bound for the value β. This is done by
computing the final trust value after 65 defections with consecutively decreasing values
of β. The iteration that results in a final trust value less than or equal to the policy limit
value, e.g., -0.8 is the upper bound on the β parameter. No α value is required to compute
this bound for β as all of the interactions used in the calculation are defection. This
method is also described by the pseudo code in Figure 9.
for(Beta = -.0001; Beta >= -.5; Beta = Beta - .0001){
T = 0; // I-Trust Variable
for(count = 1; count <= MAX_ATTEMPTS; count++){
Simple_Interaction(Defection); // Computes I-Trust with
Beta
}
if (T <= POLICY_LIMIT){
return Beta;
}
}

Figure 9 Beta Bound Pseudo Code
The fourth step is to determine additional bounds for α and β. These bounds are
used to reduce the search space required to establish the optimal I-Trust parameters for a
specific system. With the upper bound for β computed previously, the lower bound for β
along with bounds for α are established.
The lower bound on β is based upon the nature of the modeled behavior and the
design of the I-Trust algorithm. This lower bound for β is set at -0.5 for this system
optimization, as higher values would be unrealistic for this. As the parameter beta
approaches -0.5, the parameter α must also increase in magnitude to avoid false positives
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in the system. Values for β above -0.5 do not provide effective results when modeling
trust based on the command authentication count. This is due to instability associated
with large β values and the associated large α values required to maintain low false
positive rates. The bounds for β as discussed are shown on a number line representing
the search space for optimal α and β values, see Figure 10.
With both bounds for β established, the bounds for optimal α are addressed. The
upper bound for α is limited by the absolute value of β. Additionally, the α parameter has
a lower bound of zero. The zero α lower bound is a result of the positive nature of the α
parameter discussed in Section 3.3.3.1. These relationships are also captured in Figure 3,
which highlights the bounds and exclusion areas for α and β. The exclusion areas are
marked by hashed boxes, which indicate values not included in the parameter search.
Horizontal arrows on the number line indicate the direction of the parameter search.

Optimal α, β Search Space
β‐Bound
β

α

‐.5

α ≤|β|
Min Effective β
Figure 10 Number Line for Optimizing α and β Parameters
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The final step in configuring the I-Trust mechanism is to search the possible
values of α and β that provides the fewest false positives, and meets the desired security
posture. Searching the available values of α and β requires additional information
regarding the system being configured. The critical factors based upon system design
necessary to perform α, β optimization are the expected failure (defection) rate for a
legitimate user and the number of interactions per encounter. Additionally, the
configurable search parameters are: the step size for incrementing α and β, the number of
times to sample each random encounter, the desired maximum false positive rate for the
system, and bounds for average trust value. The average trust value relates directly to the
desired system security posture by keeping I-Trust values balanced which enables
reliable detection of an attack during a command encounter.
The search method used to identify the optimal α and β values begins with a loop
over the β value starting at the previously established upper bound. This β loop will run a
second loop which will search α from zero to the absolute value of the current β. These
nested loops will cover the bounded values for both I-Trust algorithm parameters, see
Figure 11.
for(Beta = Beta_Bound; Beta >= -.5; Beta = Beta - BETA_INCREMENT){
for(Alpha = 0; Alpha <= absval(Beta); Alpha = Alpha +
ALPHA_INCREMENT){
Series_Of_Encounters();
}
}

Figure 11 α and β Loop Pseudo Code
Within the α loop, a series of encounters are executed base upon the number
established by the search parameter. This series of encounters is a loop over the number
of encounters which computes each series of interactions. The number of encounters
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computed should be large enough to significantly indicate the average number of false
positives the system will generate per encounter. The average interaction trust value for
each encounter is computed, along with the average of all encounters for a given set of
parameters (α, β). Additionally, the number of false positives experienced during the
series of encounters is calculated. Pseudo code for the series of encounters loop is shown
in Figure 12.

Series_Of_Encounters(){
for(Encounter = 0; Encounter < RANDOM_ENCOUNTERS; Encounter++){
Interaction_Series();
if (ISeries_False_Positive > 1){
Encounter_False_Positive++;
}
ISeries_Avg_Sum = ISeries_Avg_Sum + ISeries_Avg;
}
Encounter_Trust_Avg = ISeries_Avg_Sum / RANDOM_ENCOUNTERS;
}

Figure 12 Series of Encounters Pseudo Code

The series of encounters loop contains a loop to execute a series of interactions in
an encounter. This interaction series loop processes the number of interactions specified
for each encounter, while calculating statistics necessary for the series of encounters.
Each interaction is determined to be either cooperation or defection based upon the
system being modeled. In this case each legitimate interaction has a one in ten chance of
being defection. If at any time in the interaction series the trust value falls below the
policy limit, a false positive is counted. A pseudo code example of this loop is shown in
Figure 13.
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Interaction_Series(){
//All variables are initialized to zero
for (Interaction = 1; Interaction <= NUM_INTERACTIONS;
Interaction++){
if ((rand() % 10 + 1) == 1) IR=0;
else IR=1;
// Run the random interaciton through the Simple Trust
Algorithm
// Alpha and Beta are set by their loops
// An interaction of 0 is defection; 1 is cooperation
Simple_Interaction(IR);
// Check for false positive in interaction set
if(T <= POLICY_LIMIT){
ISeries_False_Pos ++ ;
}
//Accumulate a sum to average the Interaction Trust Values
ITrust_Sum = ITrust_Sum + T;
}
// Calculate the average interaction trust value
ISeries_Avg = ITrust_Sum / NUM_INTERACTIONS;
}

Figure 13 Interaction Series Pseudo Code
The search for optimal I-Trust parameters is complete when user conditions are
met with regards to false positives and average trust value. These parameters are checked
at the end of each series of encounters and are reported as the result of the optimization
for α and β. The initial values returned from the search are optimized based upon the
input parameters. The results of this process is illustrated with a complete example; see
Table 13. A sample screen shot from the optimization tool which calculated the optimal
I-Trust parameters is shown in Figure 14.
Table 13 Optimization Example 1
Optimization Example Setup
False Negative Rate
.001
Policy Limit
-.8
Step Size
.0005
False Positive Rate
0
Average Trust Value
±.06
Expected Failure Rate
1/10
Interactions Per
200
Encounter
Encounter Samples
1,000

Optimization Example Results
Attempts
65
β Bound
-.0245
α Result
.0025
β Result
-.0245
Result Avg Trust
-.04
False Positives
0
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Figure 14 I-Trust Parameter Optimization Tool

With an input of 0.001 for an acceptable false negative rate the resulting number
of attempts is 65. The policy limit of -0.8 establishes an initial bound for β of (-0.0245).
The initial result is α = 0.0025, β = -0.0245, which meets the requirements for false
positives and average trust rating. A graph displaying this result for Example 1 is shown
in Figure 15. From the graph of the interaction trust value versus interaction number we
see the trust value drops below the policy limit exactly at the required 65 interactions for
the initial abuse case (where the red line crosses -0.8). Additionally, the legitimate user
will maintain an average trust rating of 0.04.
A second abuse case is also shown where the attacker transmits commands to be
processed during the legitimate ground station's command session. This activity begins
at interaction 50 and continues through the end of the simulation. The I-Trust value for
this case drops below the policy limit before the end of the encounter, however it requires
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more defection interactions to reach this limit. This is due to the occasional cooperation
interactions supplied by the legitimate ground station.

Yu and Singh - Interaction Trust Vs Abuse Case (Forgery Attack)
Alpha = .0025 Beta = -.0245
1
Legitimate RAND (1/10)

0.8

Attack (1/10)

0.6

Pattern (1/10)

0.4

Attack During Legitimate Activity

0.2

I-Trust
0
Value
‐0.2
‐0.4
‐0.6
‐0.8
‐1
0

50

100

150

200

Interaction
Figure 15 Example 1: Initial I-Trust Optimization
While the α and β values in the Example 1 result are optimal for the input
requirements, they can be enhanced for faster response to the malicious events while
maintaining a low false positive rate. This is achieved by continuing the search process
through α, β and selecting a set of parameters which results in zero false positives after an
increment in β which results in extensive false positives. This selection of I-Trust
parameters is made without consideration for the trust average. The resulting parameters
are taken at the point where the minimum α is given for the current β, while maintaining

93

a user acceptable false positive rate. By selecting this solution we get increased security
potential with minimal false positives. An example which illustrates this solution is
shown in Figure 16, with optimization settings in Table 14.

Yu and Singh - Interaction Trust Vs Abuse Case (Forgery Attack)
Alpha = .0295 Beta = -.1638
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Legitimate RAND (1/10)

I-Trust
0
Value

Attack (1/10)

‐0.2

Pattern (1/10)

‐0.4

Attack During Legitimate Activity

‐0.6
‐0.8
‐1
0

50

100

150

Interaction
Figure 16 Optimization Example 2: No Average Constraint, Min Alpha for Beta
Table 14 Optimization Example 2
Optimization Example Setup
False Negative Rate
.00015
Policy Limit
-.8
Step Size
.0005
False Positive Rate
0
Average Trust Value
N/A
Expected Failure Rate
1/10
Interactions Per
200
Encounter
Encounter Samples
1,000

Optimization Example Results
Attempts
9
β Bound
N/A
α Result
.0295
β Result
-.1638
Result Avg Trust
.675
False Positives
0
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200

Example 2 shows increased performance for identifying the initial attack pattern,
with 9 attempts bringing the trust value down to the policy limit. Additionally, the
number of false positives for the series of encounters is zero, which is the same as in
Example 1. This modified method of selecting α and β results in a higher overall trust
average of 0.675, which may not be suitable when identifying attacks during extended
encounters. An example of where this optimization would not fit a mission requirement
is where emphasis is placed on the threat of an attacker intruding on an ongoing
command session. With reference to Figure 16, if an attacker were to begin the forgery
attack after legitimate interaction 150 instead of 50 as shown, the system would require
additional defection interactions to identify the attack. This results in a final method for
selecting optimal α and β parameters.
Both methods for optimizing selecting I-Trust configuration parameters are
combined, which will result in: minimum α for the current β, an overall average trust
rating within a specified range, and false positives within a user defined range. Results
from this selection method can identify an attack independent of an active legitimate
commanding session in fewer interactions than the initial method. Additionally, this
selection method provides an active defense posture during a legitimate commanding
session not seen with the first two selection methods. An example of optimization results
utilizing this selection method are shown in Table 15 and Figure 17.
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Table 15 Optimization Example 3
Optimization Example Setup
False Negative Rate
.00035
Policy Limit
-.8
Step Size
.0005
False Positive Rate
0
Average Trust Value
±.06
Expected Failure Rate
1/10
Interactions Per
200
Encounter
Encounter Samples
1,000

Optimization Example Results
Attempts
22
β Bound
N/A
α Result
.0095
β Result
-.0789
Result Avg Trust
.059
False Positives
0

Yu and Singh - Interaction Trust Vs Abuse Case (Forgery Attack)
Alpha = .0095 Beta = -.0789
1
Legitimate RAND (1/10)

0.8
Attack (1/10)

0.6

Pattern (1/10)

0.4

Attack During Legitimate Activity

0.2

I-Trust
0
Value
‐0.2
‐0.4
‐0.6
‐0.8
‐1
0

50

100

150

Interaction
Figure 17 Optimization Example 3: Average Constraint, Minimum Alpha for Beta
Example 3 shows the result of the optimization incorporating the minimum α for
β, constrained average trust rating, and constrained false positives. The key benefit of
this method is a compromise between initial security and extended defense posture. The
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200

low absolute value of average trust rating provides relatively constant threat response
throughout a command encounter. False positives are also managed with this method
with zero false positives reported in 1,000 command encounter samples.
The optimization results with constrained average, false positives , and minimum
α can only exist within a small band of possible parameter values. These represent the
globally optimum results and are acquired by searching the parameter space starting from
high values of β. Figure 18 illustrates pseudo code implementing the three methods of
selecting and reporting results from the parameter optimization.
if (Encounter_Trust_Avg > -1 * AVG_TRUST && Encounter_Trust_Avg <
AVG_TRUST){
//Extract Result "Initial Optimization - Average in range"
{
if((false_pos_sum < false_pos_prev)&&(false_pos_sum <=
FALSE_POS_RATE)){
if ((Encounter_Trust_Avg > -1 * AVG_TRUST) &&
(Encounter_Trust_Avg < AVG_TRUST)){
//Extract Result "Average in range, Minimum Alpha for Current
Beta"
{
else{
//Extract Result "Minimum Alpha for Current Beta"
}
}
false_pos_prev = false_pos_sum;

Figure 18 Optimization Result Selection
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Appendix B. Illustrated CTMS Test Sequence
Utilizing the test environment described in Section 4.2, three Flight Software
(FSW) builds were tested with the forgery attack sequence presented in Section 4.4. The
FSW build used in the following illustrations is FSW-B, which consisted of basic
CubeSat FSW with the Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) architecture
implementation. The FSW was also modified to utilize the CTMS implementation by
inserting CTMS Application Programming Interface (API) calls into the command
handler application to monitor command interactions and enforce policy actions.
Furthermore, a CTMS specific telecommand (secure unlock) was added to the basic
flight software which utilizes the credential trust mechanism to authenticate ground
stations. The CTMS secure unlock command was used in this test scenario to
acknowledge the detection of an attack sequence and to restore commanding
functionality for anonymous ground stations. This is necessary as anonymous
commanding can be disabled by system security Policy 3 described in Section 4.5.
The first step in this example CTMS test sequence corresponds to a normal
satellite telecommanding scenario. The legitimate ground station in this step transmits a
sequence of commands without user authentication to the satellite. This activity
increments the satellite's onboard command authentication counter and increases the
Interaction Trust (I-Trust) value for the anonymous CTMS user.
The satellite diagnostic port is monitored during the legitimate command
sequence. The diagnostic port displays the following information: the byte pattern for
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each command received, command specific details, a policy evaluation result, and the
current CTMS I-Trust data. Figure 19 is the last message displayed on the satellite
diagnostic port after the legitimate command sequence is completed.
The first line in the diagnostic output shown in Figure 19 is the byte sequence for
the last telecommand received. The second line is a header indicating the following five
lines are details regarding the processing of the last command received. These details
indicate what type of message was received (MessageID), the result of a policy check
(Trust OK...), and the action following the policy check (CMD... will be processed). The
remaining information is the current CTMS I-Trust data. This data indicates that the
entity tracked in the TMS with MemberID 0 has two associated simple I-Trust metrics.
MemberID 0 represents interactions from unauthenticated users. The I-Trust metrics
correspond to trust values computed based upon the command authentication count
marker using the simple I-Trust algorithm. The reason for computing multiple trust
values for the same marker is to demonstrate the configurable nature of the CTMS
architecture to match a target systems specific performance profile. The topic of
performance is addressed further in Section 4.7.1 and Appendix A.

Figure 19 Step 1, Satellite Diagnostic Port Output
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The I-Trust values displayed for Metric 0 and Metric 1 are positive values, which
indicate the series of legitimate commands received during the normal command
sequence. These values were both initialized to zero and have different values in
Figure 19 due to each metric being associated with individual I-Trust parameters as
shown. MetricID 0 is used in the policy evaluation for this experiment, and as the trust
value for this metric is above the policy limit of -0.5 the command was processed.
The second step in the CTMS test is the execution of a forgery attack on the
satellite. This attack is an instance of the abuse case described in Section 4.4. Once the
legitimate command session has completed and the satellite has moved into the attackers
field of view, the malicious sequence of commands are transmitted.
The malicious commands in this experiment are transmitted by a custom
commanding tool. These commands are similar to those which were sent by CGA in
Step 1, however the proper command authentication count is unknown to the attacker.
Figure 20 shows the custom commanding tool setup for this step of the experiment.
The command selected for transmission is a simple no operation command. This
commands only function is to test the command transmission and execution path. Below
the command selection in Figure 20 are the command header fields, which are setup for
the no operation command. There are no arguments for this command so the command
data field is blank. The Command Authentication Count (Auth Count) field is shaded to
indicate that for the forgery attack this field will be incremented after transmission for the
number of attempts indicated.
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Figure 20 Step 2, Custom Commanding Tool Setup

Figure 21 Step 2, Invalid Command Authentication Count Error

During the attack, telecommands are received by the satellite with an invalid
command authentication count value. The error generated by this activity can be seen on
the diagnostic port, see Figure 21.

Portions of the diagnostic output from the last

legitimate command processed remains on the screen while the attackers command and
error information are below.

Each command received with an invalid command
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authentication count is considered a defection by an anonymous ground station and the
I-Trust value for the CTMS member ID is decreased.
Once the attack sequence reaches the current satellite command authentication
count, the attackers command is evaluated based upon system security policy. The trust
value shown in the diagnostic output for this event is now -0.9996, which is well below
the policy limit of -0.5, see Figure 22. The output also shows the policy evaluation,
which resulted in the command being rejected.

Figure 22 Step 2, Trust Policy Check During Attack

As the interaction trust values for anonymous entities is now below the policy
limit it can only be restored through the secure unlock command. This command is
generated and transmitted to the satellite using the custom commanding tool, see
Figure 23. The secure unlock command contains a unique authentication credential as an
argument in the command data field. Upon processing this command, the satellite will
restore the I-Trust values to zero which will re-enable anonymous commanding.
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Figure 23 Secure Unlock Command Transmission

The third CTMS test step is execution of the secure unlock command. The
unlock command is processed to evaluate the authentication credential, which is a more
authoritative form of trust than the interaction trust value. The diagnostic output for the
credential evaluation follows the verification procedure outlined in Section 4.3.2. This
unlock command follows the last invalid command sent by the malicious user, which is
indicated by the error at the top of the diagnostic display, see Figure 24. The decrypted
authentication credential is displayed on the diagnostic port followed by the checks
necessary to validate the credential. All of the checks are successful in this test which
results in the I-Trust trust values for the anonymous MemberID being set to zero along
with the command authentication counter.
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Figure 24 Step 3, Secure Unlock Command Processing

The final step in this example CTMS test is to transmit legitimate anonymous
commands to the satellite for processing.

Since the secure unlock command was

executed, the I-Trust value for anonymous commanding is set to zero. Since the I-Trust
value is now greater than the policy limit of -0.5, anonymous commands will be
processed. Additionally, the command authentication counter was reset to zero, which
will allow the legitimate ground station to begin commanding with that count. The first
successful legitimate command after the unlock is verified with the diagnostic port output
shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25 Step 4, Legitimate Commanding Following Unlock
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